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PREFACE 
At the close of the 64th Session of Congress on March 4, 1917, 
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, declared publically in 
an ill-considered outburst, "A little group of wilful men have rendered 
the great government of the United States helpless and contemptible. nl 
This was his immediate and violent reaction to the filibuster which 
ended the Congress and failed to grant him the authority he requested 
for arming United States merchant ships. Wilson went on to arm the 
merchant ships by Presidential proclrunation and the short period of 
United States "armed neutrality 11 came into being. The 11overt 11 act was 
soon forthcoming and the United States on April 6, 1917, became an 
Associate Power in the war against Germany and Austria. 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss and evaluate the political 
factors concerning the arming of the merchant ships and the filibuster. 
Why did the small group, led by the controversial Senator LaFollette of 
Wisconsin, thwart the will of the great majority of the Senate? What 
did they hope to accomplish? What was their purpose? Yv'hat were the 
political factors involved? What was the reaction of the common people 
of the United States? Was this group right? These are some of the 
elements that I have attempted to include in illlf discussion of the attempt 
to get Congressional approval for the arming of American merchant ships 
when Germany announced her campaign of unrestricted warfare against the 
shipping of the world. Attempt is made, at all times, to consider the 
factors within a Political Science framework and to analyze cause and 
1T. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 643. 
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effect rather than give a recounting of the happenings. The first and 
last chapters are generally historical but it is felt that this is 
necessary in order to give a complete picture of the happenings of forty 
years ago. 'I'he heart of the thesis is chapter three and accordingly a 
majority of the time and effort was devoted to that chapter. 
In m;y bibliograprty, I have tried to include all materials to which 
specific reference is made in the text of the work. Many excellent works 
that were useful in the formation of the background for the paper are not 
included. Special dependence has been placed upon the Congressional Record 
and, to a lesser degree, the New York Tiroos. The many periodicals read and 
studied and many of the books contain the emotions of partisanship. They 
do indicate what the leaders of public opinion were thinking and provided 
very interesting reading. Several of the 11 revisionist 11 books of the inter-
war period were included in order to get the viewpoint of these 11why 11 after-
the-event writers. Attempt was made to analyze both sides objectively (if 
that is ever possible) and to present both sides of the controversy. In 
m;y research, I was unable to find any book or periodical which specifically 
dealt with the happening. 
In the quotations, there are some minor grammatical technicalities 
that are incorrect. However, I have not made corrections, because I 
preferred a strict exactness of quotation even at the cost of sacrificing 
grammatical perfection. 
I want to thank Doctor Hubert S. Gibbs, Chairman of the Department 
of Government of Boston University, for his aid in planning this thesis 
and suggestions for form and subject matter. 
iv 
CHAPTER I 
FACTORS INFLUENCING AlviElUCAN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
AND PUBLIC OPINION, AUGUST 1914 TO FEBRUAii.Y 26, 1917 
The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, 
June 28, 1914, created only a flury of excitement in the United States.l 
When it then became evident that Europe was being sucked into the terrible 
vortex of war, the American people were greatly relieved and thanked God 
for having the good sense to have made the Atlantic Ocean and to have 
placed it between North America and Europe. The Literary Digest thus 
surmned up newspaper reaction: 11 0ur isolated position and freedom from 
entangling alliances inspires our press witn tile cheering assurance that 
we are in no peril of being drawn into tne European quarrel. 11 2 America 
felt strong, smug, and secure. 
Among all the conflicting opinion about the immediate circumstances 
that precipitated that conflict, one thing is historically certain: the 
United States was the only great power completely disassociated from the 
controversies which led to the outbreak of tne war. Neither the people of 
the United States nor the persons whom they had placed in governance knew 
very well what it was all about. This included the diplomats, several of 
them literary personages, most of the other political personages, newly 
installed in the principal capitals of Europe by the incoming Wilson 
Administration.3 President Wilson promptly proclaimed American neutrality 
and requested the American people to be neutral in thought as well as action. 
lc. c. Tansill, America Goes to War, p. 17. 
2Literary Digest, August 15, 1914, p. 260. 
3s. F. Bemis, ! Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 590. 
1 
All leaders of American life at the conmmncement of the holocaust were 
in favor of the President's position. 
THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 
International law, as regards the seas, was in an uncertain state when 
the war broke out in 1914. There had been no great maritime war for one 
hundred years and the important developments had been the Declaration of 
1856 (following the Crimean War), the accepted Civil War practice of the 
United States, and the Declaration of London of February 26, 1909. 
The Declaration of London constituted the best statement of maritime 
laws as they stood in 1914 and marked the high tide of liberalizing these 
laws. In attendence at this conference were Germany, Austria, Spain, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the Netherlands. Items 
discussed were blockades, contraband, resistance to search, compensation, 
etc.l A code was drawn up and was acceptable to most countries including 
the United States and Germany. Great Britain refused to ratify it as the 
House of Lords considered it too favorable to neutral commerce--a considera-
tion which had prompted Germany to accept it. When Great Britain rejected 
the Declaration, the President of the United States withheld final rati-
fication.2 
The early British modifications of international law, to suit their 
own purposes and aid in the enforcement of their blockade, caused considerable 
hard feeling and anger in the United States. The British interception of 
American ships and their actions in regard to contraband and their liberties 
in regard to visit and search were considered as detrimental to American 
rights. American ships were forced to detour into British ports and be 
lJ. B. Scott, The Declaration of London, February 26, 1909, p. 160. 
2op.cit., Note 1, p. 596. 
2 
searched due to the Germac'l submarine menace. This often caused loss to 
American owners and frequently operated to the advantage of their 
British competitors. In May, 1915, the British-born Secretary of the 
Interior, Franklin K. Lane, exploded: 
There isn' t a man in the Cabinet who has a drop of 
German blood in his veins, I guess. Two of us were born 
under the British flag. I have two cousins in the British 
ariDlf, and Mrs. Lane has three. • • Yet each day that we 
meet we boil over somewhat, at the foolish manner in which 
England acts. Can it be that she is trying to take advan-
tage of the war to hamper our trade?l 
The British blacklist of July 1916 which forbade their subjects to do 
business witn some 85 American firms was very irritating to Americans. 
This anti-British feeling resulted in Congress giving the President re-
taliatory powers and aided the passage of the Naval Appropriations Bill of 
1916.2 The British blockade produced another practice--opening of Ameri-
can mail--which proved particularly obnoxious to the people of the United 
States. In later years, Colonel House stated, doubtless witn exaggeration, 
that if it had not been for the more serious offenses of Germany in her 
submarine warfare it would have been well-nigh impossible to avoid hostili-
ties with Great Britain. 
PRQ-ALLIED INFLUENCING FACTORS 
At the beginning of the war the great majority of Americans wanted 
to stay neutral although on the whole their sympathies lay on the side of 
Great Britain, France and their Allies, and against GernBny and Austria 
and the other Central Powers. The wealthy and well educated could not 
forget their cultural heritage and Anglo-Saxon blood. They admired the 
lT. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 617. 
2c. Seymour, House Papers, II, p. 311. 
3 
institutions of England and France and did not like Germany whose 
Prussian institutions they distrusted. Russia being in the picture did not 
effectively spoil the essential dualism of right and wrong. After almost 
a century of Anglophobia and tail twisting, relations with Great Britain 
had been good, particularly after the Venezuelan blowup of 1895-1896 and 
the repeal of the canal tolls.l There was also great enthusiasm for France 
and the debt owed to that country by the United States. The jingle from 
the pen of Robert Underwood Johnson came: 
Forget us, God, if we forget 
The sacred sword of Lafayette 1.2 
The economic factors which drew the nation to the Allied side con-
tributed greatly to the final Pro-Allied influences. Before the war in 
Europe in 1914, foreign trade had been fairly evenly distributed among 
the great importing nations of Europe. This distribution was upset by the 
war's outbreak. Great Britain's blockade reduced our trade with her 
enemies to almost nothing. In addition, the Allies themselves needed vast 
amounts of materials from America. The following chart indicates the re-
sult quite clearly:3 
Percentage of United States Exports to: 
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 
Germany 13.45 14.58 1.04 .01 .Oh 
France 5.93 6.76 13.34 14.50 16.09 
United Kingdom 24.22 25.13 32.93 35.24 32.54 
lT. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 612. 
2~., p. 612. 
3uni ted States loreign Commerce Reports, 1913-1917. 
4 
In the year 1916, the United States broke all existing trade records 
and became the world's greatest buyer and seller. ~xports reached 
~.5,481,000,000, which was far and away a new record. This showed a gain 
of $1,926,ouo,ooo over 191.5 and an increase of ~$2,997,000,000 over 1913. 
Within the United States, tne business of United States Steel in 1916 showed 
a profit of #333,62_5,000 and a total business roore than twice the best 
previous year.l Allied war orders alleviated a serious depression in the 
United States and launched a period of unprecidented prosperity. 
The decision to permit the floating of loans on behalf of the Allies 
was a potent Pro-Allied influencing factor. At the start of the war, 
President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan opposed loans but Wilson soon 
sanctioned and encouraged loans to the Allied belligerents. By the time 
the United States had entered the war, American private bankers had loaned 
$2,300,000,000 to the Allies in cash and credit and only :~27,000,000 to 
Germany.2 Speaking for the House of Morgan, Thomas W. Lamont later de-
clared: 
From the very start we did everything we could to 
contribute to the cause of the Allies.3 
While British propaganda has been JTUl.Ch maligned by the revisionist 
writers and others as a primary reason for getting the United States into 
lvorld Nar I, there is still doubt of its effect. American opinion was 
somewhat anti-German before the war began and was rendered ;nore so by 
German acts. The invasion of Belgium and the sinking of shipping such as 
the Lusitania outraged American opinion. The British propaganda organization 
lcurrent History Magazine, New York Times, warch, 1917, p. 11)3. 
2T. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the illnerican People, p. 622. 
3Ibid., p. 622. 
.5 
embellished these acts and made the most of them. This was accomplished 
by seizing the Atlantic cable and censoring the news dispatches, and 
operating a well-developed propaganda organization in the United States • 
.Almost without exception news stories were censored by the Bnglish. The 
net result was that Americans came to view the war largely through Allied 
glasses .1 
The British used their propaganda organization in tne United States 
skillfully and effectively. 'Lney understood .anglo-Saxon psychology and with 
the advantage of a common language were quiet, discreet, and effective. 
They enlisted many influential Americans--teactlers, politicia.ns, journalists, 
etc., to tneir cause and tried to convince Americans that England was fight-
ing their fight. Among tne writers enlisted were: James M. Beck, John 
Burroughs, Julian Jay Chapman, Joseph Choate, Albert Bushnell Hart, and 
George Harvey.2 The Bryce Report had considerable effect due to the world 
wide reputation of the author. 
Another influencing factor on American public and congressional opinion 
was the famous Zimmerman Note. This communication of January 16, 1917, 
instructed the German Minister in .Mexico to propose to Mexico an alliance 
with the object of recovering the "lost territories" of Texas, New Mexico, 
and Arizona in case the United States should not remain neutral. Mexico 
was asked also to invite Japanese adherence to the plan.3 'The note was 
intercepted and deciphered by British authorities who turned it over to 
the American government. The authenticity of the note was proven beyond 
all doubt when the Foreign Secretary (Zinnnerman) naively admitted the note 
lT. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the American Feople, p. 613. 
2w. Kniseley, A Study of Woodrow Wilson's and Senator LaFollette's 
Speaking ~the World War Issue, p. 12. 
3s. F. Bemis, ! Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 613. 
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was authentic. This note was even more repulsive to President Wilson when 
it became kno~n that use of American diplornatic communication facilities, 
made available to the German Ambassador to the United States as a courtesy, 
had been used to transmit t11e note to Mexico. This was probably the most 
stupid diplomatic blunder of the entire war period, according to Ray 
Stannard Baker in his treatise on the affair.l A tremendous wave of anti-
German sentiment swept the country, especially in the Southwest and uV"est 
Coast. 
GERMAN SUBMARINE WARF AH.E 
On February 4, 1915, Germany announced that it would establish a 
war area around the British Isles and would attempt to destroy any ships 
found within that area. The official announcement declared that this 
drastic step had been made necessary as a result of Allied attempts to starve 
out Germany by illegal practices, and that these practices had been acqui-
esced in by the neutral powers (including the United States).2 
The legality of this action, by the German government, has been the 
subject of much analysis by the historians of the \'Vorld Nar period. As 
the submarine was a new development, its use in vrartime had not been con-
sidered by international conferences as had the longer established instru-
ments of naval warfare. Its peculiar technical nature gave it special 
effectiveness and imposed limitations on its use. The submarine was vul-
nerable to the guns of an enercy ship and of prime value as in instrument 
of war only when it could torpedo a ship from a submerged position or 
lR. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 474. 
-- -
2T. A. Bailey, ~ Diplomatic HistOI"J of the American People, p. 624. 
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when its commander could be sure that the ship was not armed. The 
Government of the United States, from the first, considered such action 
contrary to international law.l Germany contended that the submarine 
campaign was justified as a retaliation for the Allied blockade which 
was starving her population. 
Very soon after the opening of the submarine campaign Arnerican citizens 
traveling in the 11war zone 11 were affected. On February 22, 1915, the Brit-
ish ship Falaba was sunk: after a twenty-three minute warning with the loss 
of one American life. This was the first instance in which an American 
citizen was killed as a result of German submarine activity. On April 28, 
the American steamer Cushing was sunk and on 1~y 1, another American ship, 
the Gulflight, was torpedoed. Before much American action in protest was 
taken, the Lusitania was sunk on May 7, with 128 Americans including 37 
women and 21 children being lost.2 
The circumstances surrounding the Lusitania sinking were of a highly 
controversial nature. The day before the ship sailed the German govern-
ment had placed an advertisement in several New York newspapers warning 
American citizens not to book passage. The Germans charged that it carried 
ammunition and explosives and that it was armed. The British government 
denied these charges. Tansill cites the report of the New York Harbor 
.Authority which stated the amount and types of ammunition carried on the 
last trip of the Lusitania.3 
The sinking of the Lusitania had a great effect upon 1L11erican public 
opinion and feeling. One authority said: "Germany paid for it with the 
ls. F. Bemis, ! Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 601. 
2Ibid., p. 6 04. 
3c. c. Tansill, america Goes to War, p. 282. 
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loss of a war •111 The immediate feeling was reflected in the Des Moines 
(Iowa) Register and Leader in an editorial which began: 111'he sinking of 
the Lusitania was deliberate murder 1!2 The New York Times demanded that 
"The Germans no longer make war like savages drunk with blood. 11 3 The 
United States protested to Germany in a series of notes which were strong 
and to the point. 'I' he incumbent Secretary of State, William Jennings 
Bryan, resigned over the second of these notes and Robert Lansing became 
the Secretary of State. Germany, as a result of tnese protests and the 
further protests over the sinking of the British passenger st1ip Arabic, 
promised to abandon the practice of sinking on sight any ships in the 
11war zone 11 unless they resisted or tried to escape.4 
On March 24, 1916, an unarmed F'rench passenger ship, the Sussex, 
was torpedoed by a German submarine, with heavy loss of life and serious 
injury to several Americans. This attack was unquestionably a violation 
of the German pledge not to sink unresisting passenger liners without 
warning. Secretary of State Lansing's note to Berlin of April 18, 1918, 
stated: 
Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately 
declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of 
submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying 
vessels, the Government of the United States can have no 
choice but to sever diplomatic relations.5 
Germany replied to this note and acceded to the American demands but with 
the string attached that other belligerents must respect the "laws of 
lMark Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 107. 
2Ibid., p. 120. 
3New York Times, Iv1ay 15, 1915. 
4T. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 630. 
5Ibid., p. 634. 
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" 
humanity. 11 This would have required the British to have relaxed its 
blockade of Germany. In the second message the American reply rejected 
the concession and the Germans were maneuvered into an unconditional 
acceptance of the American demands.l 
The Sussex pledge held good until the German government announced 
on January 31, 1917, its unrestricted submarine campaign. Henceforth 
U-boat commanders would attempt to sink all ships--neutral or belligerent, 
passenger or merchant--in the specified zone. The United States was to 
be allowed to send one passenger vessel a week to Falmouth, England, under 
conditions which were insulting to a great nation. This was aptly de-
scribed by John Bach Mc~~ster as follows: 
Our country has now received its orders. Once each 
week one passenger steamship, striped like a barber's pole, 
and flying at each masthead a flag resembling a kitchen 
tablecloth, might leave one port of t,he United States, 
making its way along a prescribed course, enter a speci-
fied port in England on a Sabbath day, or be sunk without 
warning. Had the German armies been in possession of every 
foot of our soil from the Atlantic to the Pacific, these 
orders could not have been more tyrannical.2 
The violation of the Sussex pledge by Germany left the United States 
with no recourse consistent with national honor and previous steps except 
to break relations with Germany. Accordingly, on February 3, 1917, 
President Wilson appeared before Congress and in a dramatic speech announced 
that diplomatic relations had been broken with GerrrBny. 
lR. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 198. 
2Mark Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 258. 
10 
PRO-GERMAN INFLuENCING FaCTORS 
When the countries of Europe became engulfed in war in 1914, there 
were a great many population groups in the United States who were strongly 
pro-German. These were the hyphenated American groups of German-Americans, 
Irish-Americans, Austrian-Americans, Hungarian-Americans, and some Jewish-
Americans. The German-Americans were the largest group of this type in 
the United States and were largely congregated in tne isolationist mid-west 
areas. Of the 32,243,382 persons in tne United States who were foreign 
born or who had one or both parents born in Europe, about half came from 
the Central Powers.l These elements were naturally favorable to Germany 
and formed a strong ethnic minority for remaining neutral or aiding the 
Central Powers. These groups all began to take sides, organize, and to 
express themselves in foreign language newspapers. Tnis phenomenon caused 
many to wonder if the United States was not an international boarding 
house. 
'I'here was a fairly strong group of pacifists in the United States in 
the early years of the war. After his resignation as Secretary of State, 
Willi~~ Jennings Bryan provided leadership and spokesmanship for the 
pacifists who had, in part, a common objective with the pro-Germans. 
Bryan addressed and provided inspiration for such groups as the German-
American Alliance, United Irish Societies, American 'l'ruth Society, 
American Independence Union, .American Humanity League, American Nomen 
of German Decent, and the German-American Peace Society.2 The position 
lT. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 611. 
2Nmrk Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 160. 
ll 
that Bryan took combined the attitudes of both pro-Germans and pacifists. 
This was to forbid Americans to travel on vessels of the belligerents, to 
forbid American ships to enter the war zone, and to resist all movements 
for preparedness. 
Other pacifists of note were Henry Ford, Jane Addams, Oswald Villars, 
Prof. George W. Kirchway of Columbia, Samuel S. IllCClure, and Judge Ben. B. 
Lindsay.l Henry Ford and his "peace ship 11 tne Oscar II and his expensive 
but unsuccessful trip to .ri;urope to attemct to secure an end to tne holocaust 
were unique in history. 
German propaganda had some effect upon American publj_c o~~inion but 
in general was rather poorly handled. '1he Ger,ndns ciid not ·oasically 
understand the American psychology. They vvere clmnsy and often lost more 
than they gained. Handicapped by their own actions, such dS the invasion 
of Belgium, the Germans never succeeded in really putting their case 
across to the·American people. They were often caught in propaganda acts 
or making indiscreet disclosures such as that of Captain Von Papen, 
German attache stationed in tne United States, when he wrote nis wife, 
11 1 always say to these idiotic Yankees that they snould shut their 
rnouths. n2 Certain German Americans such as George Sylvester Vie rick, who 
conducted a weekly paper, The Fatherland, tried to influence American 
thought in favor of Germany. iv';any of these writers pointed out the kind-
liness of the German people, quoted their poets and pointed out their achieve-
ments in science. A sample of the German propaganda which appeared in 
1Mark Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 160. 
2New York 'l'imes, Current History Iv1agazine, p. 275. 
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the New York Post read as follows: 
Down with England'. Down with the boot-licking 
kowtowing British hirelings in our press and our Ad-
ministration. • • Up and at them1• Enough of truck-
ling to their good graces, enough of asking for fair play. 
Up and at them'. Up you Americans who have not 
forgotten 1776. • • Up you Poles, Hungarians, Austrians, 
Czechs, Germans, Irish, Swiss, Scandinavians, up every-
body, who stands for Old Glory first and all the time, 
for his fatherland next and the rest of time ••• 1 
The early lack of success of German propaganda may have partially 
accounted for the Germans turning to sedition and conspiracy against the 
United States. The fermenting of' strikes, sabotaging of' munitions plants, 
and other plots served to turn the Aruerican people and the great majority 
of government officials strongly against them during the years of American 
neutrality. 
GORE-McLEMORE RESOLUTIONS ON OCEAN 'l'RAV£1 OF AMERICANS 
During the latter part of 1915 and early 1916 there was consider-
able sentiment in Congress to bar Americans from traveling on belligerent 
ships and thereby prevent any happenings which might conceivably involve 
the United States in the European War. These ideas were supported by the 
pro-Germans and pacifists. The chief spokesman, outside of Congress, was 
Williams Jennings Bryan, the ex-Secretary of State and three time loser 
as a presidential candidate. These sentiments reached their apex during 
the first session of the 64th Congress when resolutions were introduced 
in the House and Senate for this purpose. 'l'hese resolutions constituted 
a direct challenge to the leadership of President Vfilson, interference in 
foreign affairs by the Congress, and a challenge to his party leadership. 
1T. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 614. 
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They would have nullified the presidential policy based on international 
law which held that Americans had the right to travel on belligerent ships 
and to hold Germany responsible for the loss of any American lives due to 
her submarines. 
The first resolution was introduced into the House by Jeff l'ilcLemore 
of Texas, on February 17, 1916. It provided tnree main lines of attack 
which were: (l) Forbid issuance of passports; (2) Forbid clearance of 
armed vessels; (3) Warn passengers off belligerent ships.l President 
Wilson reacted immediately to this challenge to his leadership. It seemed 
to arouse his fighting spirit.2 In a letter to Senator Stone, the Chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he unequivocally stated 
his position as follows: 
For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgement 
of the right of American citizens in any respect. The 
honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. V'ie covet 
peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of 
honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for 
fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a 
deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but 
explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rig~nts of 
mankind anywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. 
It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud 
position as spokesmen even amidst the turmoil of war for 
the law and tne right. It would make everything this 
government has attempted and everything that it has achieved 
during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and 
futile.3 
On February 25, the day following President Wilson's letter to Sena-
tor Stone, another resolution was introduced into Congress, this time in 
the Senate by Senator 'l'homas D. Gore of Oklahoma. This resolution stated 
that American citizens should 11forbear to exercise the right to travel 
1congressional Record, 64-l, p. 2756. 
2R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 167. 
3R. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow iVilson, p. 123. 
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as passengers 11 on armed belligerent snips .1 At this time the sentiment in 
Congress seerood to favor the passage of ooth these resolutions. President 
1Vilson decided he must know exactly where he stood and forced the issue 
by writing Representative E. W. Pou, then ranking member of the House Comr 
mittee on Rules, asking for an early vote on the Gore and McLemore resolu-
tions so that our foreign relations r~ght be cleared of damaging misunder-
standings.2 
The esteemed gentlemen on capitol hill failed to stand to the 
Presidential ultimatum and the downfall of the temporary revolt was swift 
and complete. The Senate tabled the Gore resolution of N~rch 23 by an 
overwhelming majority and the House did likewise with the McLemore resolu-
tion on March 7. 
lcongressional Record, 64-1, p. 3120. 
2H.. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 173. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STRUGGLE IN CONGRESS 
Following the breaking of relations with Germany on February J, 1917, 
and the dismissal of the German Ambassador Count von Bernstorf, there was 
a short interlude before the President made the decision to go to Congress 
and ask authority to arm American merchantships. During this period there 
was tremendous pressure brought to bear upon Wilson to arm the ships. 1wo 
American snips, the Housatonic and the Lyman ~· Law, had recently been sunk 
but these had ample warning and there was no loss of life. However, fear 
of Germany had in effect blockaded the entire eastern American seaboard. 
Ports were crowded with ships riding at anchor. Business was slowing 
down. Ship-owners naturally declared it was t.he government's duty to 
protect them. Great quantities of wheat and cotton were piling up and 
threatened to dislocate American economic life. The merchant ships would 
sail if the government would give them arms and gun crews, make them, in 
the technical phrase, 11 armed merchant vessels. 11l 
The cabinet of Wilson favored arming tne merchant ships and was 
nearer open revolt on this issue than at any other time during his adminis-
tration. Wilson was unwilling to go as far as the members of his cabinet. 
He seemed to believe that some of the members of the cabinet were bent 
upon pushing the country into war.2 Particularly vociferous were l'i.lcAdoo, 
Lane, Houston, and Redfield, Secretaries of Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, 
and Commerce respectively •. After a series of cabinet meetings, feelings 
1Mark Sullivan, OUr Times, Vol. 5, p. 263. 
2n. F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, p. 234. 
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became so heated that it was thought Houston and iVlcil.doo would resign from 
the Cabinet.l 
It is believed that Wilson was becoming convinced of the need for 
arming the merchantships when the Zinunerman note arrived at the White 
House. Wilson was shocked and indignant. He could scarcely believe the 
disclosures concerning the proposed Mexican action should war break out 
between Germany and the united States. '.Lnis was tne clincher for the arm-
ing of the merchant ships and the attempt at 11 armed neutrality • 11 vVhile 
the President believed he had the necessary authority by his constitutional 
duties and powers, he said, "I prefer in the present circumstances to feel 
that the power and autnority of Congress are benind me in whatever it may 
become necessary for me to do."2 
While President Wilson was making up his mind about going to Congress 
on the arming of merchant ships, Senator .i:iobert LaFollette, of Wisconsin, 
who was destined to become his bitter antagonist on tne issue, was having 
premonitions concerning possible Administration actions. Some days before 
lhlson went to Congress, LaFollette nad sought to forestall the arming of 
ships by introducing a resolution in the Congress. 'lnis Senate Joint 
Resolution (211) provided: 
That it shall be unlawful at a time wnen the United 
States is not at war for any merchant vessel of the 
United States to be armed and to depart from a port of 
the united States or any of its territories or possessions 
for a port of any otner country, its colonies, or 
possessions.3 
The resolution was reaci, then tableo i"or later consideration. The hew York 
lD. F'. Houston, Eight Years witr1 Nilson's Caoinet, p. 239. 
2R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 472. 
3congressional Record, 64-2, p. 3064. 
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Times wrote that the majority of Senators "were inclined to deplore the 
raising of the armed ships issue •111 
At a ,joint session of the two Houses of Congress on February 26, 1917, 
President Wilson requested to be authorized to supply our merchant ships 
with defensive arms. In his address, he said in part: 
Our own commerce has suffered, is suffering, rather 
in apprehension that in fact, rather because so many of 
our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports than 
because .&'118rican ships have been sunk. • • Two American 
vessels have been sunk, the Housatonic and the Lyman M. 
Law. • • If our ships and our people are sparea;-It will 
"i5'80ecause of fortunate circumstances or because the 
co~~ders of the German submarines wnich they may happen 
to encounter exercise an unexpected discretion and re-
straint rather than because of the instructions under 
which those commanders are acting. It would be foolish 
to deny that the situation is frought with the gravest 
possibilities and dangers. No thoughtful man can fail to see 
that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, 
if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our 
elementary rights as a neutral nation. • • 
I cannot in such circumstances be un;nindful of the 
fact that the expiration of the term of the present 
Congress is immediately at hand, by constitutional limita-
tions; and it would in all likelihood require an unusual 
length of time to organize the Congress which is to succeed 
it. • • No doubt I already possess that authority without 
special warrant of law by the plain implication of my 
constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in the 
present circumstances, not to act upon general implication. 
I wish to feel that the authority and power of Congress 
are behind me in whatever it may become necessary for me 
to do •••• 
Since it has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard 
our right by diplomatic means against the unwarranted in-
fringements they are suffering at tne hands of Germany, 
there may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which 
we shall know how to maintain and for wnich there is 
abundant American precedent ••• 
War can come only by the wilful acts and aggressions 
of others ••• 
1New York Times, February 24, 1917. 
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I request that you will authorize me to supply our 
merchant ships with defensive arms, should that become 
necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ 
any other instrumentalities or methods that may be neces-
sary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in 
their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas. I 
request also that you will grant me at the same time, 
along with the powers I ask, a sufficient credit to en-
able me to provide adequate means of protection where 
they are lacking, including adequate insurance against 
the present war risks.l 
The address to Congress was well received by both Houses, Bills 
were shortly introduced into both branches of Congress to give the Presi-
dent the substantiating authority which he requested. At tne beginning, 
it appeared that the measure would go through Congress with little or no 
opposition. 
ACTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
The request of the President was soon translated into action in the 
House of Representatives by the introduction of H. R. 21052 by Mr. Henry 
D. Flood of Virginia, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The 
bill was sent to conunittee where it was slightly revised on February 27 
and returned to the floor of the House on March 1. The bill provided 
essentially what the President had requested. In part it read: 
That the President of the United States be, and is 
hereby, authorized and empowered to supply merchant ships, 
the property of citizens of the United States and bearing 
American registry, with defensive arms, and also witn the 
necessary ammunition and means of making use of them in 
defense against unlawful attack; and that he be and is 
hereby authorized and empowered to protect such ships 
and the citizens of the United States against unlawful 
attack while in a lawful and peaceful pursuit on the high 
seas.2 
1Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Review of Reviews, p. 363-365. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4682. 
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The additional portions of the bill dealt with tne appropriation of 
$100,000,000 for insuring vessels against war risk and the selling of 
bonds to provide for the raising of these funds. 
On March 1, the House sat as a Committee of the Whole to debate 
the arming of American merchant ships. Debate was limited to three hours 
with both sides getting one and a half hours time. The pro side was con-
trolled by Representative Flood the introducer of the bill, and the op-
position was led by Representative Henry A. Cooper of Wisconsin. 
The Congressmen in favor of the bill advanced many reasons for their 
support in the speeches during the debate. .Among the various reasons they 
gave for their support were the following:l 
a. It was less likely to lead to war. 
b. The rights of Americans must be protected. 
c. The honor of America must be defended and protected. 
d. The country must unite back of the President. 
e. It is the patriotic thing to do. 
f. We must uphold international law. 
g. We will lose national self-respect. 
h. The President already has the authority and this will show 
Congress is back of him. 
i. The commercial interests of America require support. 
The opponents of the bill were equally vociferous and attacked the 
bill vehemently on many points. The opponents expressed themselves to be 
against the arming for some of the reasons given ~elow:2 
a. It was a declaration of war. 
b. Congress was relinquishing its powers. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4636-4691. 
2Ibid., p. 4636-4691. 
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c. Congress giving up its responsibilities. 
d. The people of the United States do not want war. 
e. Too much power would be given to the President. 
f. There was not enough time to properly debate the matter. 
g. The bill would aid profiteers and commercial enterprises. 
h. American food and resources should be kept at home. 
'l'he Congressmen strongly favoring the bill and supporting it vigor-
ously were Flood, Virginia; Emerson, Ohio; :Mann, Illinois; Henry, Texas; 
Kitchen, North Carolina; Foss, Illinois; Rogers, Massachusetts; Temple, 
Pennsylvania; Bennett, New York; and Austin, 'tennessee. In opposition 
to the bill were Cooper, Vvisconsin; Campbell, Kansas; Shackleford, Missouri; 
King, lllinois; Decker, Missouri; Dillon, South Dakota; anu Helgeson, North 
Dakota. 
There were six attempts to amend the bill during the session on March 1, 
1917. The nature of the more significant of these attempts to alter the 
bill are indicated below: 
That no ship of American registry while armed in the 
manner aforesaid shall carry a cargo consisting in whole 
or in part of arms or ammunition consigned to a belligerent 
country. 
Nothing herein will be construed as a denial of the 
legitimate right of visit and search. 
That no passports shall be granted any American 
citizen intending to take passage upon any ship bound for 
a foreign port and carrying arms or munitions of war.l 
These attempts were decisively beaten and the bill remained as introduced 
into the House. After the third reading, Mr. Cooper of Wisconsin offered 
1congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4689-4691. 
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a motion to recommit the bill to Committee. The vote was taken and the 
motion beaten by 293 to 125 with 15 not voting.l 
After the attempt to recommit, the bill was brought to a vote and 
passed by the overwhelming margin of 403 to 14 with 17 not voting.2 
THE EARLY STAGES IN THE SENATE 
Following the address of President Wilson to the joint session of 
Congress, Senator Stone of Missouri, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, moved that the address be referred to the Cormtittee on 
Foreign Relations. The next day, February 27, the Senator introduced a 
bill (S. 8322) authorizing the President of the United States to supply 
merchant ships with arms. The bill provided: 
That the commanders and crews of all merchant 
vessels of the United States, and bearing the registry 
of the United States are hereby authorized to arm and 
defend such vessels against unlawful attacks, and the 
President of the United States is hereby authorized and 
empowered to supply such vessels with defensive arms, 
fore and aft, and also with the necessary ammunition and 
means of making use of them; and that he be, and is here-
by, authorized and empowered to employ such other instru-
mentalities and methods as may, in his judgment and 
discretion, seem necessary and adequate to protect such 
vessels and the citizens of the United States in their 
lawful and peaceful pursuits on the high seas.3 
Other features were that ~100,000,000 be appropriated for tne insurance 
element and bonds be sold to raise the necessary funds. It may be noted 
that the 11 other instrumentalities 11 clause was inserted in this bill as 
a change from that introduced in the House. 
lCongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4691. 
2Ibid., p. 4692. 
3rbid., p. 4399. 
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Senator Lal?ollette, obviously playing for time, objected to the 
second reading of the bill, an action which retarded it one day. During 
the argument which ensued, l'iir. vvatson asked if lvlr. Stone might tell 
whether or not the bill was a unanimous report of the committee, but the 
latter refused to make any statement. The following day, Senator McCumber 
submitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for Senate bill 8322. 
This amendment read as follows: 
I submit an amendment in nature of a substitute for 
Senate Bill 8322, authorizing the President to supply 
merchant ships with defensive arms and to employ such 
instrumentalities and methods as may, in nis judgment 
and discretion, seem necessary and adequate to protect 
such vessels and the citizens of the united States in 
their peaceful pursuits on the high seas, and for other 
purposes, which I ask may be printed and lie on the 
table.l 
The action requested in the amendment was taken. 
The parliamentary struggle began in earnest in tne early morning of 
March 1, when shortly after midnight of the preceding day, Mr. Stone moved 
for an adjournment with the end in view of securing consideration of his 
bill. He hoped to secure "unanimous consent" for consideration of the 
bill and supported adjournment on the basis that no other business except 
for nominations·for reference and reports of nominations already received 
would be considered.2 lvir. Penrose moved tnat the Congress adjourn until 
ten-thirty that morning; 1v'Ir. LaFollette, ten o'clock; and Mr. Hitchcock, 
twelve-fifty-five of that morning. This last proposal would give a recess 
of only ten minutes as it was then almost twelve-forty. After the Senate 
re-convened at tne time specified (twelve-fifty-five a.m.), LaFollette 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. LMl3. 
2Ibid., p. 4400. 
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refused "Lo dispense wi tn the reading of the Journal until Nlr. Stone promised 
tnat the bill would take its usual course, go to co;,lraittee that ctc'_y, be 
reported back that day, and then go over to }.'arch 2. LaFollette was ob-
viously trying to gain time in wilich to prer::are for debate and possible 
defeat of the bill by filibuster. The procedure was followed and shortly 
~hereafter the Sencite took a recess until ten tne next morning.l 
The bill was thus prevented from being considered until the morning 
of March 2. A unanimous consent to debate and vote uvon tne Naval 
Appropriation bill, however caused lVJr. Stone's resolution to be set aside 
in the mornine; and held over until the ai'ternoon. Snortly after four 
o'clock on that afternoon, by a vote of seventy-seven to fourteen, the 
Senate proceeded to consider the bill. 
LaFOLLE'l"lE AH..itANGES A liLlbUS'l'ER 
The obvious course for LaFollette anci those working with him was 
to prevent the bill from coming to a vote. By the right of unlimited 
debate in the Senate, the bill could be talked to dea~h in the closing 
hours of Congress. 'I'his was a role that fitted LaFollette exactly. His 
speeches were long and he could speak for hours without relief. He did not 
mind the disfavor which meets obstructionist tactics and liKed the atten-
tion of the country as a whole. He seemed, in tilis case, to be motivated 
by a sincere conviction that the bill would take the right to declare war 
from Congress and put it in the hands of tt1e President in a thoroughly 
unconstitutional manner. He was joined in this filibuster by six Repub-
licans--Senators Norris, Nebraska; Kenyon, Iowa; Cummins, Iowa; Gronna, 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4565. 
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North Dakota; Clapp, IVJ.innesota; and liorks, California--and five Democrats--
Stone, lVJ.issouri; 01 Gorman, New York; Kirby, Arkansas; Lane, Oregon; and 
Vardaman, lvlississippi.l 
Inasmuch as Senator Stone was not in accord with t.ne bill, Senator 
Hitchcock of Nebraska, the next ranking member of the :F'oreign Affairs 
Committee, took charge of the management of the measure. Mr. Stone, after 
relinquishing control of the measure, then tried to amend the bill to for-
bid the manning of guns, the carrying of munitions, and the carrying of 
supplies to belligerents.2 The amen~ments were never brought to a vote and 
would have been unquestionably defeated if they had. Senator Hitchcock 
made repeated attempts to bring the matter to a vote and attempt to limit 
speeches. The only accomplishment was the enactment clause of the House 
bill (H. R. 21052) was substituted for the enactment clause of the Senate 
bill. In the early morning of March 3, at twelve-forty a.m., Senator Hitch-
cock compromised with the unrelenting opposition when he agreed to a recess 
until ten a.m. of that day on the condition that t11e bill be made unfinished 
business of the Senate. This compromise proved to be the beginning of the 
end for the Administration's proposal as it was later ascertained. The 
following remark from a memorandum of a conversation between Senator Norris 
and Mr. Harley A. Notter, made many years later is quoted: 
"We have got them beaten, 11 said Norris to LaFollette. 
11We can hold out now. We 1 ve enough speakers to filibuster 
from tomorrow on. 113 
The Senate reconvened at ten a.m. on March 3 on what was to be the 
last meeting of the 64th Congress. N~. Hitchcock struggled to get a 
l.R.. s. Baker, and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
p. 434. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4745. 
3R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, p. 480. 
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unanimous agreement to vote on the bill or limit speeches and each time 
was frustrated by one of the filibustering group. Senators Norris of 
Nebraska, and Cummins of Iowa, were constantly objecting. Nhen Norris 
was accused of obstructionist tactics, he answered: 
I would not hesitate to kill the bill if I could. 
I have already said I would be glad to kill it if I could. 
I do not know that I am even going to talk at all on it; 
but I object to having the debate run on for a couple of 
days by those who are in favor of the bill and then an 
effort be made to gag those who are opposed to it. I am 
within my right in objecting, and I do object to a limita-
tion of any kind.l 
Tentative hours suggested by Hitchcock, rurming all the way from six in 
the evening of March third to ten o'clock on the morning of March fourth, 
were rejected. 
'I'he filibuster was carefully planned in advance so that each of the 
Senators opposing the bill should speak on it, consu1ning as much time as 
possible. 'I'hus Senator Stone occupied four hours. Senator Gronna spent 
an hour discussing rural problems in North Dakota. Senators Works, Norris, 
Cummins, and Clapp made long speeches with the others helping out as needed. 
Senator Norris was later to write: 
I warned each member of the filibuster that he 
must be ready when the Senator who had the floor sur-
rendered it, and that he must immediately address the 
presiding officer. If we permitted a moment to elapse, 
the presiding officer would put the question, and the 
conference report would be agreed to.2 
The careful preparations continued to pay off as during tne long night of 
April 3 the measure was kept from coming to a vote. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4895. 
2M. Gross, 'I'he Legislative Struggle, p. 376. 
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RESOLUTION OF THE SEVENTY-FIVE 
At three thirty a.m. of March 4, the Senators supporting the bill 
presented a prepared manifesto which they had planned to issue to the 
public in case the few opponents of the bill succeeded in preventing a 
vote. Senator Hitchcock in making a statement when this was about to 
be introduced said: 
Therefore, at this hour, when the defeat of this 
measure by exasperating and procrastinating debate, 
simply for the purpose of delay, threatens to prevent 
Senators from going on record--at this hour, when that seems 
to be i~~nent, we propose by putting this statement in 
the Record to show that nine-tenths of the Senate are 
ready to vote and anxious to vote and want to vote for 
this bill, but they are being prevented by 12 Senators, 
practically, of the Senate who refuse us an opportunity 
to vote. Then the world will know that the Senate is 
with the President, as the House of hepresentatives was 
with the President, nine to one.l 
Following the statement, Senator Hitchcock yielded the floor to Senator 
Robinson of Arkansas, who introduced the following resolution: 
The undersigned United States Senators favor the 
passage of s. 8322, to authorize the President of the 
United States to arm ~~erican merchant vessels and to 
protect American citizens in their peaceful pursuits 
upon the sea. A similar bill has already passed the 
House of Representatives by a vote of 403 to 13. Under 
the rules of tne Senate allowing debate without limit 
it now appears to be impossible to obtain a vote prior to 
noon, JI{Jarch 4, 1917, when the session of Congress expires. 
We desire this statement entered in the Record to estab-
lish the fact that the Senate favors the legislation and 
would pass it if a vote could be had.2 
The above was signed by seventy-five Senators at the time and was 
later to be signed by two more. Those not signing, except for the twelve 
engaged in the filibuster, were absent from the Senate during the period 
due to health reasons or government business. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4988. 
2rbid., p. 4988-498 9. 
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There were some vociferous and vehement outcrys from the filibusterers 
upon the presentation and recording of the manifesto. Senators Clapp and 
Works were particularly eloquent in their denunciations of the majority 
group for taking this method of making known their desires and pointing 
out the persons responsible for failing to provide the American merchant 
ships with the arms requested by the President. 
CONGRESS ADJOURNS 
Final attempts of the Senate leaders to secure a vote on the bill 
were as fruitless as the earlier ones. LaFollette was adamant and he had 
enough speakers on his side to carry through to the end of the session. 
When it became evident that the filibuster would succeed in spite of the 
strong majority in favor of immediate vote and passage, the Administration 
faction planned their revenge. It was well known that LaFollette planned 
the most spectacular scene for the last few hours of tne session when he 
should speak against the bill. They determined to prevent him. 
The closing hours of the Senate always provide the best audiences. 
The audience on the fourth of lVJarch was particularly to Mr. LaFollette's 
liking, declared the New York 'I'imes.l The galleries were filled and over-
flowing, while long lines waited outside in "Lhe hope of taking the place 
of those who might leave. Tl1e diplomatic group were occupying the section 
reserved for them and were immensely amused at the strange spectacle of a 
few men defeating tne will of the great majority. LaFollette was in the 
height of his glory, quite unaware of any conspiracy to rob him of nis hour 
of triumph. But when he sought recognition, it was denied. In angry 
lNew York Times, March 5, 1917. 
--------
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indignation he protested. Senator Hitchcock refused to yield and the Chair 
upheld him. LaFollette argued and fumed, but to no purpose. He interrupted, 
he objected, and even charged his opponent witn falsehood. The New York 
'.i'imes described the scene with grim humor: 
Towards eleven o'clock on the last day of the session, 
LaFollette seemed beside himself witn rage.- He wore a fixed 
smile, and his eyes were blazing, while his round face was 
turned to a deep red. His voice was high and harsh and 
screaming and he would bounce out of his seat and thrllst his 
jaw forward as he yelled at Hitchcock in an effort to drown 
out the Nebraskan' s even tranquil voice; and then he would 
laugh in a discordant, provocative voice and call over to 
the stenographer some sentence he wanted tnem to take down 
though Hitchcock was still talking imperturbably away.l 
In the midst of Mr. Hitchcock's remarks, at twelve o'clock noon, the Sixty-
fourth Congress expired.2 
Although prevented from making his speech before the Senate, LaFollette 
was determined to be heard. He wrote the New York Times setting forth his 
reasons for opposing the Armed Snip bill. These were as follows: 
l. The bill was unconstitutional for it gave the President the 
right to make war. 
2. It was useless, for it seems impossible to fight tne submarine 
with ordinary guns on board ship. 
3. It was not impartial, for if we mean to assert our rights 
by armed force, we should do so not only against Germany, 
but against England, "Which established the first war 
zone in violation of international law. 11 
L.. 'I'he bill was injected into Congress at tne last moment when 
urgent bills c~rrying enormous appropriations awaited 
consideration.j 
The reaction to the filibuster and tne defeat of the President' s 
proposal to arm American merchant ships was violent in the nations press 
lNew York Times, March 5, 1917. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. )020. 
3New York Times, April 2, 1917. 
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and at the White House. ~aFollette and nis Senate cohorts were castigated 
by most newspapers and by many of the nation's leaders. Some of the re-
sults and the effects of the action will be discussed in a later chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF THE STRUGGLE IN CONGRESS 
The defeat of the great majority in Congress by a small minority 
electrified the United States and the world. The reaction in tne United 
States was irmnediate and violent. The filibusterers were called traitors, 
iscariots, lovers of 1-'russianism, delinquents, and m.any other equally 
unsavory names by the newspapers of the nation. The President was vehement 
in his denunciation of the 11li ttle group of wilful men. 11 'rhe Allies looked 
on rather cynically from Europe and wondered about the great democracy 
that was spawned across the sea. The only people happy with the obstruc-
tionist tactics were the Central Powers and the small group of pro-Germans 
and pacifists in the United States. 
In analyzing the bitter struggle, it may be well to consider some 
of the factors which were among the ingredients. Such items as party 
effect, sectionalism, pressure and ethnic groups, isolationism, inter-
ventionism, and the personality factor will be considered. The opinions 
and viewpoints of the opposing leaders will also be examined to determine 
the effect they had on the struggle. What did the filibuster signify? 
What did the small group hope to gain by so obviously flaunting the will 
of the majority and jeopardizing their own political careers? What did 
they hope to accomplish by this type of tactic? These, and other elements, 
must be considered in attempting to bring analytical clarity out of the 
chaos of the controversy. 
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PARTY LINES 
The 64th Congress was elected to office in 1916 with Woodrow Wilson 
and the "he kept us out of war" slogan. This Congress was destined to be 
one of the most important in the history of the United States. At the 
start of the second session of this Congress, the majority belonged to 
the Democratic Party after the successful election of 1916. The majority 
was not excessive but was sufficient to give the Democrats the necessary 
control needed for their legislative programs. At the opening of the 
second session of the 64th Congress the parties in Congress stood as 
follows:l 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Progressives 
Progressive Republican 
Independent 
Socialist 
Prohibitionist 
Progressive-Protectionist 
Progressive-Democrat 
Total 
Senate 
55 
4l 
96 
House of 
Representatives 
227 
199 
3 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
435 
The Vice-President of the United States, who presided over the Senate, 
was Thomas R. ivlarshall of Indiana. The President Pro 'I'empore of the 
lcongressional Directory, 64-2, p. 195. 
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Senate was Williard Saulsbury of Delaware while t:ne Speaker ol' the House 
was Champ Clark of Missouri. The Democrats had, in the usual custom, 
organized both Houses of Congress and all the important committees were 
chaired by Democrats.l 
The voting patterns in this Congress as far as the 11party line 11 
concept of normality goes were unusual. They were greatly effected by the 
war in Europe and as the war progressed the differences between the parties, 
as far as political philosophy and opposition party are concerned, became 
less and less. In the first years when neutrality was the watchword and 
President Wilson was talking in terms of 11oeing too proud to fight," the 
Republicans were for preparedness and strong action against Germany while 
the President's party tended to follow his more moderate leadership. 
Henry Cabot Lodge was the strongest and most interventionist minded of 
the Congressional leaders. However, after Wilson came out for preparedness, 
the differences beca~e less and less as far as party lines were concerned 
and other elements, such as sectionalism, isola~ionism, interventionism, 
and the personality factor exerted more influence on the actions of 
individual Senators and Representatives. 
There was no evidence of the party factor having much to do with 
the controversy over arming American merchant ships in either the Senate 
or the House. In ~he vitrolic debate in the Senate on March 4, 1917, 
Senator Ollie P. James, a Democrat from Kentucky and one of the leaders 
of the Senate, in debating a point concerning the "Manifesto of the 75, 11 
said: 
11The Senator speaks of the majority. There are no party 
lines in this figi1t, I rejoice to say. The Senators who 
lcongressional Directory, 64-2, p. 163-193. 
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signed the statement constitute a majority of his own 
party as they constitute a majority of our party. 11 l 
The same statement could have been made concerning the struggle in the 
House over the question. The New York Times Current History Magazine 
quoted Representative Flood of Virginia, the Chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs committee, and a leader in getting ~he bill passed: 
The passage of the bill in the House was marked by 
many patriotic addresses and a complete lack of parti-
zanship; the leaders of the Republican minority advocated 
the measure as enthusiastically as the Democratic leaders.2 
While, of the Representatives voting against passage of the bill the majority 
were Republicans, this may be discounted because of the small numbers in-
valved and the apparent overiding elements of sectionalism and isolationism. 
Of the fourteen voting against the bill in the House, ten were Republicans, 
three were Democrats and one was Socialist. In the Senate, the party split 
was quite even. Aligned with LaFollette in the filibuster were six Repub-
licans and five Democrats. 
While in a political struggle of any sort it is often dangerous and 
foolish to discount the party influence and effect, it can be said, with 
reasonable certainty, that party lines were almost non-existant in the 
armed ship controversy. There might have been some little element present 
at the start but this bore little weight in view of the stronger influences. 
SECT IONALlSM 
When party unity breaks down the cause is usually sectionalism.3 
This was generally true in the House and Senate during the controversy over 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4993. 
2New York Times Current History M.agazine, p. 50. 
3a. 1. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, p. 14. 
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the arming of merchant ships and was one of the most important considera-
tions in the defeat of the bill in the Senate. Tr1e balance of the opposi-
tion came from the center of the country--the great farming areas which 
were far from the sea and the effects of tide water. Ship building, 
foreign affairs, commerce and other elements which intimately tied the 
Eastern Coastal areas to t.t1e war in Europe, were not paramount considera-
tions for the central Great Plains. The areas of the country--New England 
and North Atlantic, the South, Border States, Lake States, Great Plains, 
Rocky Mountains, and Pacific Coast--will be considered individually in 
analyzing the effect of sectionalism on the Congressional action. 
The support for arming the merchant ships was strongest in the New 
England and North Atlantic states in both parties and in both Houses of 
Congress. Some of the reasons were as follows: shipping and commercial 
interests, nearness to ~urope, the Anglo-Saxon heritage (possibly off-set 
by the Irish-Americans), the desire to protect American rights, the 
desire to preserve international law, and the belief that the honor of the 
United States must be upheld. Two of the most influential Senate leaders 
who fought for the bill's passage during the controversy were Henry Cabot 
Lodge of Massachusetts, and Frank B. Brand.egee of Connecticut.l In the 
House of Representatives WilliamS. Bennett of New York, and John J. Rogers 
of Massachusetts, performed similar service for the Administration.2 Among 
those in opposition to the bill, there could only be found two from both 
Houses of Congress. These were Senator JaJnes A. 0' Gorman of New York and 
Representative Meyer London of the same state. 01 Gorman, in attempting 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4751, 4866. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4639, 4644. 
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to justify his vote, later said that he was not against the bill but only 
the provision having to do with the arming of ships which might carry 
munitions.l .tiepresentative London was the only Socialist in Congress 
and it might be said that his opposition could have been anticipated and 
expected. 
Those who maintain that the Civil War made the United States a united 
nation, one and inseparable, sometimes fail to mention that the eleven 
old Confederate States of America still form a socio-political unit. The 
Southern states' Congressional liepresentatives were almost unanimous in 
their support for President Wilson's bill. A great deal of this was pro-
bably ~the fact that they were all Democrats except for a few 
Congressmen who were elected from the outlying mountain districts of 
Tennessee and North Carolina. Their main reasons for this support, 
other than party unit solidarity were: protection of United States 
commerce, upholding tne honor of the United States, upholding interna-
tional law, against German militarism, patriotism, and generally a pro-
British attitude. John Sharpe VfilliaJns of Iviississippi, was one of the 
strongest supporters of the bill.2 The junior Senator from J:dssissippi, 
Jaraes K. Vardaman voted against the bill and appeared to i::,e one of the 
sincere pacifists in the manner of 1{illi:J.n Jennings Jryan of whom he was 
a disciple. Strong support for tile bill in tne Eovse c 1 ·t8 i"rom 1tepresen-
tatives Henry D. Flood oi' Virginia, Claude Kitcnen of North Carolina, 
Charles Stedman of North Carolina, and J. 'J.'homas Heflin of .Lliabama.3 
The Border states of Kentucky, l11aryland, Jidssouri, Olkahorna, and 
West Virginia followed the Eastern seaboard in their attitude on tt1e 
loutlook, March lh, 1917, p. 4h5. 
2congressional fl.ecord, 64-2, p. 4991. 
Jrbid., p. L~637, 4D46, 4651. 
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controversy although tne Congressional attitudes were milder. Tney seemed 
to generally decrease in activity and strength of support as they moved 
farther in toward the interior and away from tne coast. The issues raised 
by those favoring the bill were basically the sar'le as those of the Eastern 
groupings. These were for upholding international law, protection of com-
merce, upholding the honor of the United States, as some of the basic 
issues influencing this section. Senator Willia.rn J. Stone of Missouri, 
became one of the filibusterers who defeated the bill. He was generally 
pacifistic and anti-British in his beliefs aDd seemed to consider the 
bill unconstitutional. Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma was, on the 
other hand, one of the strong supporters of the bill. In the House, 
hepresenta.tive J. Charles Linthicum of Maryland, spoke strongly for the 
bill while Dorsey W. Shackleford, and Perl D. Decker of Missouri, were 
opposed.l 
The Lake states of Ohio, Indiana., 1richigan, and Illinois were luke 
warm in their support of the armed merchant ship proposal. These states 
have a combination industrial and agricultural econo~y and hence are 
usually mixed in their political opinions. 'l'he industrial elements were 
generally in favor of the proposal while the agricultural sections tended 
to be somewhat isolationistic and to belong to the 11 avoid war at any cost 
group. 11 They showed a smattering of Congressmen favoring both sides 
althoughthey probably could be described as somewhat in tne middle be-
tween the Atlantic seaboard interventionists and the America first con-
cept of the Great Plains section which opposed the legislation. In general 
strongly favoring the bill were such as Hepresentative Hen~r I. Emerson 
libid. 
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of Ohio, anci James H.. Mann of Illinois, while opposing was Edward J. King 
also of Illinois.l 
1'he Great Plains region showed tne main opposition groupings. This 
is somewhat traditional for this section as it is primarily agricultural 
and far removed from the seacoast and outside influences. The opposition 
to the proposal and the leaders of the filibuster were centered around the 
states of Wisconsin, Nebraska, lVJinnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. 
'l'hese states, along with .WJissouri, furnished the only direct opposition 
in the House and almost all of the filibustering group along with its 
avowed leader, Senator hobert LaFollette of Wisconsin. The main reasons 
for the opposition to the President's proposal, given by this group, were: 
Congress was giving up its responsibilities, it might lead to war, it 
was not fair to Germany, Wall Street was to blame for the involvement, 
the timing of the bill, and a general anti-British and pro-German feeling. 
ivluch of the rather sparse population was, anci is, of German and Sc andi-
navian descent. This accounts, to a large degree, for the pro-German 
attitude. This was shown more in the Senate due to the larger proportionate 
representation of the Plains states in tnat body. The sparse population 
resulting in few Representatives made the area less influential in the 
House than in the Senate. In addition to the leader, Senator LaFollette 
of Wisconsin, the area had Senator George Norris of Nebraska, Senator Albert 
B. Cummins of Iowa, and Representatives William H. Stafford of Wisconsin, 
Charles Lindberg of Minnesota, and Henry A. Cooper of 'Nisconsin,as leaders 
opposing tne bill.2 Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, was the only 
strong proponent of the legislation fro;n the great plains. 
lcongressional liecord, 64-2, p. 4639, 4640, 4646. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4895, 4908, 4652. 
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The .H.ocky l,'[ountain states played little ;:;art in the sectionalism 
aspect of the controversy. The Congressional rcpresentati ves -;rere in 
general favorable to the ar::nin:::s of the shi1Js. The reasons for their 
favoring ran about the sane as tnose of the East,ern seaboard except there 
vras less emphasis placed upon the com:nercial aspect and more on the pro-
tection of rights and honor, along w·ith upholding international law. 
Senators Thomas J. Nalsh of Montana, Charles S. Thomas of Colorado, and 
Albert B. Fall of New Mexico vmre among the leaders of the Senate in the 
attempt to get the bill passed.l 
The Pacific Coast members of Congress supnorted the arming of mer-
chant ships in the final accounting. This section vied wir,h the New 
England and North Atlantic, and Southern states in its support for tr1e 
legislation. However, in the vote to reCOJilrni t in the House, prior to 
passage, over fifty percent of the 19 members from the Pacific Coast 
voted to recommit. .All of these members then voted for passage of the 
bill. This section did not produce any of the stronger leaders either 
pro or con in the controversy. In the Sena-c,e, two Senators joined the 
filibuster group but were not instrutnental in the leadership of this 
small group. They were Senators John D. ~vorks of California and Harry 
Lane of Oregon.2 Mr. Works (born and raised in Indiana) seemed to be 
somewhat of an isolationist while Senator Lane leaned toward pacifism. 
Respect for international law and the rights and honor of the United 
States were some of the factors which seemed to influence the attitudes of 
this section. 
1
congressional Hecord, 64-2, p. L75L~, 4770, 4761. 
2Ibid., p. 4995, 5oo2. 
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As tne arming of the merchant ships Wd.S closely related to the 
various navy bills which the Congress has from tiwe to time acted upon, 
it might be interesting to compare the sectional attitudes of the areas 
of the United States on naval legislJ.tion vdth that on the armed ship 
controversy. The period of 1921-1932 will be used for the action on 
Navy Legislation as it is close enough to present a reasonable comparison. 
l'he vote to recommit the bill to Cormnittee in the House will be used as 
it is considered to be a better indication of true attitudes of the 
B.epresentatives than the final vote. This vote of 293 to 125 was taken 
before it was obvious that the bill would pass the House and it is ap-
parent that over a hundred Representatives changed their votes to get 
on the winning side in the final roll call. 
Sectional Attitudes on Navy Legislationl 
Percent Favorable of B.oll Call Votes on l~avy Legislation 
by Congressmen from Each Section, 1921-1932 
Section 
New England and North Atlantic 
Pacific Coast 
The South 
Rocky Mountains 
Border States 
Lake States 
Great Plains 
Bouse of Representatives 
Democrats 
92.4 
86.0 
6w.o 
75.6 
62.1 
51.9 
29.3 
Republicans 
8L, .9 
89.2 
d2 .8 
74.5 
78 .2 
71.6 
45.5 
lG. L. Grassmuck, .Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, 
p. 39. 
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Sectional Attitudes on the Vote to Eecommit 
House of Representativesl 
Section Members in 1·tlembers Voting 
House to ~Leco.rmni t 
New England & 
North 11.tlantic 123 14 
The South 105 12 
Rocky ivlountains 14 6 
Border States 47 14 
Lake States 75 20 
Great Plains 52 36 
Pacific Coast 19 13 
If the Line of the Appalachians was 'laken 
Members in lvlembers Voting 
House to Reco;mni t 
East 173 14 
West 262 lll 
in 
Percent 
11.2 
i:L 7 
42.8 
29.8 
26.6 
67.3 
68.3 
Percent 
S.l 
42.6 
It may readily be seen that all groups in the House except the 
Pacific Coast voted approximately the same on the ar1ned merchant ship 
bill as they did on the later issue of Navy Legislation. T.ne difference 
in attitude of the Pacific Coast Representatives is in a large degree 
accounted for by the greater distance from Europe and the war. This 
section had very little to gain by arming the merchantmen as they faced 
the Orient across the wide Pacific and die. not have the submarine menace 
in their front yard. On the other hand, Navy legislation would tend to 
benefit the shipping and shipbuilding interests of the area and this 
probably accounts for at least part of -che difference in attitude. 
It is readily apparent that sectionalism played a strong part in 
the armed ship controversy. It served to influence both sides in the 
l 11 How Congress Divided on the Proposal to Arm lv'ierchant Ships, 11 New 
Republic, NJarch 24, 1917, p. 218 • 
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matter. It aided passage in the House and v;as instrumental in setting 
up the filibuster in the Senate which preventeci its passage. 
PRESSURE ~~D ETHNIC GROUPS 
Of the many pressure groups which influenced Congressional action 
at the time of the proposal for legisla.tjon to arm merchant ships, none 
has been more maligned than what is referred to as 11Wall Street." This 
group made loans to the Allied governments and set in motion an econo;nic 
tie-up which was to draw the United States cwser to the Allied cause. 
Under the leadership of J. P. Morgan and COlnpany, purchasing agent for 
Great Britain and France, prominent bankers undenvrote loans which 
amounted to ~pi2,3000,000,000 dollars by the time President Wilson sent 
his request to Congress on the merchant ships .l 
There can be little doubt that ti-1is ·pressure to save their money 
influenced the Congressional action taken on the bill. Nhile direct 
reference to the loans themselves was not made within the halls of Congress, 
practically all Senators and Representatives from the areas vvith big bank-
ing interests spoke up for protecting commerce and keeping ti:1e trade lanes 
open to Great Britain and France. Senator Brandegee of' Connecticut, spoke 
up strongly for protection of cowmerce as did Senator Lodge of 1\assachu-
setts. 
The opposition to passage of the bill was quite vocal in references 
to Wall Street and the influence the bankers were having upon the Congres-
sional action. Representative James H. Davis of Texas, in a speech in the 
House said: 
1congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4861-!-, 47)1, 4639, 46h4. 
Morgan, mammon, and money, the three great I!iolochs 
that are now swaying the minds of our men and leading us 
to a death march in war, would make us sacrifice millions 
of lives and millions of money to satiate their inordinate 
greed.l 
Senator Nilliam F. Kirby of Arkansas, was equally vehement in his denun-
ciation of the money lending groups when speaking in the Senate on 
NJarch 2, said: 
What do we find yonder in New York? I picked up a 
paper two or three days ago, and it said what? It said, 
11 Wall Street is impatient of tl1e delay; Wall Street pre-
fers war to the suspense which injures business • 11 2 
It might be noted that of all the serious opposition to the bill, 
none came from the money loaning sections of New York City, Boston, and 
Philadelphia. 
Closely aligned with the money lenders were the industrialists. 
This group, particularly the munitions makers, has received much blame 
for the involvement of the United States in the war. This was due, in 
large degree, to the report of a Senate comnittee, headed by Senator 
Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota in the mid-thirties, which showed the 
munitions makers made huge profits in the years l9lh-19l7. It must be 
remembered, however, that the United States had been in a depression 
shortly before the war and the traffic in war supplies and loans to pay 
for them had brought the country out of the doldrums. In short, the 
trade vvas perhaps as essential to the economic life of America as it 
was to the military life of the Allies.3 
The support for the arming of merchant ships and hence the continu-
ing of trade and prosperity came from all the industrial sections of the 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4676. 
2Ibid., p. 4771. 
3T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 622. 
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country particularly the industrial East. The issue of con:1111erce had 
been introduced into the matter by President Wilson when he made his 
request for legislation by directly referring to the suffering of our 
shipping and the timidity of ship owners who would not leave American 
ports without guns and gun crews.l The many Congressmen who stressed 
the commercial aspects of the decline in shipping show the great effect, 
and general pressure, this group was able to exert. 
The opponents of the bill, who generally stated that the action 
if taken would lead to war, blamed the industrialists for much of the 
pressure that was exerted to enforce international law and protect our 
shipping. Representative Henry T. Helgeson of North Dakota minced no 
words when he addressed the House and said: 
In the event of war the rrnmitions makers and 
manufacturers of arms and machinery of war reap rich 
harvests of wealth. Vfuat are a few millions of human 
lives--the lives of the common people--compared with 
the enormous accretion of wealth to the chosen few? ••• 
If the people know this their voice will resound a 
mighty cry against the war that will bring death and 
destruction to the many and blood stained riches to 
the few. • • .2 
It might be noted that Mr. Helgeson and so many of his cohorts had very 
little to gain or lose as far as industry or commerce was concerned. 
The pressure of the agricultural elements was not readily apparent 
in the struggle. While practically all tne opposition in the House of 
Representatives (considering the vote to recorunit as the index) came 
from agricultural states, it.is considered this factor had less to do 
with the voting patterns than sectionalism, personality factors, and 
lMessages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Review of Reviews, p. 363. 
2Congressional B.ecord, 6u-2, p. 4660. 
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some of the otner characteristics affecting the action. In the Senate 
the same consideration held. While a certain small portion of the 
pressure producing the filibuster may have been from agricultural areas, 
once again this was not one of the primary factors. The South, being 
primarily agricultural, was strong for the bill and supported it more 
firmly than any grouping except the industrial East. 'l'his runs counter 
to the Great Plains section which, being almost entirely agricultural, 
furnished the direct and coordinated opposition. The high prosperity 
of the farmers throughout the country probably counted for the mild 
pressure this group tended to exert upon its representatives in Washing-
ton. The high farm prices caused by the shipping of great amounts of 
food to Europe did much to quiet the normal pressures. Nhile the agri-
cultural elements in the United States are traditionally anti-interven-
tionist and isolationistic, their effect was relatively minor in the 
halls of Congress on this occasion. 
The hyphenated-Americans formed one of tne pressure groups which 
exerted what pressure it coul.d to block the armed ship bill. These 
foreign born citizens, because of their prior exposure to foreign 
ideologies and customs, are limited in their political interest to a 
narrow band of issues affecting their jnother-land and tne ·welfare of 
their own nationality group. Lord Bryce in his AJaerican Commonwealth 
aptly described t:ne American foreign oorn vote: 
The immigrants vote, that is they ootain votes after 
three or four years 1 residence at ;nost (often less), but 
they are not fit for tne sufferage. They know nothing of 
the institutions of <J.t1e country, of its statesmen, of its 
political issues. Neither from Central Europe nor from 
Ireland do they bring much knowledge of the r:1ethods of 
free government, and from Ireland they bring a suspicion 
of all government. Incompetent to give an intelligent 
vote, but soon finding that their vote has a value, they 
fall into the hands of the party organizations, whose 
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officers enroll them to their lists and undertake to fetch 
them to the polls. • • Such a sacrifice of common sense 
to abstract principles has seldom been made by any country.l 
The two groupings wnich were the strongest and most vocal were 
the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans. The Irish-Americans 
in spite of much concentration in the states of N~ssachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, and New York were able to exert little pressure 
upon the members of Congress on this issue. The Congressmen from 
these states led the fight for the bill and were almost unanimous in their 
support. Contrariwise the German-American group exerted considerable 
effect upon the bill in both Senate and House. '.the strong German ele-
ments in Wisconsin, Minnesota, North and South Dakota, and Itissouri 
furnished tne backbone of the opposition in both houses. There were many 
pro-German utterances in the Congress during the debate on the bill. 
Senators Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, Moses E. Clapp of Minnesota, 
and Albert B. Cummins of Iowa along with Representatives Henry .A. Cooper 
of Vvisconsin, and Perl D. Decker of Missouri, were among those making 
pro-German speeches in their respective houses.2 The three states of 
North Dakota, Minnesota, and ~Visconsin had very high foreign born per-
centage of the population compared to the remainder of the United States. 
A perhaps non-related item of interest is that three of the most impor-
tant atter~ts to establish third political parties crune out of these 
three states and found their greatest support there. These were the 
Non-Partisan League, the Farr~Labor Party, and the Progressive Party.3 
The effect of the Eastern seaboard on the Congressional action 
lJ. Turner, Party and Constituency, Pressures in Congress, p. 98. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4999, 4908, 4637, 4649. 
3J. Turner, Party and Constituency, Pressures in Congress, p. 100. 
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has been touched upon in several ways in the previous discussion. This 
grouping which combined the pressures exerted by the industrialists, 
the money-lenders, the Southern championship of honor and rights of 
Americans, the sagacity of the Eastern political bosses and interests, 
the nearness. to the war, the Anglo-Saxon heritage and other elements was 
the largest single pressure influence upon the Congress. These interests 
controlled a majority of the important newspapers of the heavily populated 
East as well as the syndicated news agencies which sent their stories 
to the rest of the country. This area, more than others, was subjected 
to British propaganda and received the war news direct from the British 
controlled Atlantic cable. The solid unity of the Atlantic States gave 
them a strong lever to use in influencing the other members of the Con-
gress to their way of thinking. 
The pressure and ethnic groups played a moderately important part 
in the armed ship controversy. Although a great nany of the effects 
came over a period of several years, they were present at the accounting 
when the bill was passed in the House and defeated by filibuster in the 
Senate. None of these pressure and ethnic effects can be discounted in 
analyzing the struggle. 
ISOLATIONISM 
At the time of the armed ship controversy the term "isolationist" 
had not become a household term as it was later to become in the "thirties" 
and during World War II. Nevertheless, there have always been a great 
number of isolationists in the United States and there probably always 
will be, although in recent years the philosophy has become increasingly 
unpopular. During the armed ship controversy there was considerable 
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isolationistic feeling present in Congress. Many Senators and Repre-
sentatives seemed to feel that the United States should stay out of 
Europe and withdraw to our own shores and keep what we had to ourselves. 
We could "live alone and like it" was expressed many times in both the 
House and Senate by the groupings that opposed the legislation. It 
might be interesting to note that one of the isolationists was Repre-
sentative Charles Lindbergh of Minnesota, the father of the famous 
aviator who was later to play a leading role in the attempt to keep 
the United States out of European affairs in the mid-thirties prior to 
World War II. 
The preservation of ~~rican lives and resources was one of the 
topics dwelt upon by those with isolationistic sentiments. Senator 
Harry Lane of Oregon, who took a relatively passive part as one of the 
filibustering group, seemed more influenced by the food prices and the 
prospective loss of American men and resources, if the bill should be 
followed by war, expressed himself in the Senate as follows: 
I think it would be a matter of plain common sense and 
we would preserve our neutrality with all nations better by 
letting them fight it out in their nice little selected zones 
or prize ring, or whatever they wish to call it, and we could 
be the referee or help sponge them off when they get their 
noses bloodied. • • • The mass of people would do the fight-
ing and upon their backs rests the nations existence •••• 
Our food should be used for our own people and they should 
manufacture supplies at a reasonable cost, at a fair price, 
and put this country in a position so that no nation would 
think of coming over here or would think a long time before 
they would try it.l 
Senator Lane, like almost all the Congressmen in OPJ-'Osition to the bill, 
constantly referred to the fact that this bill might, or would, get us 
into the war and attacked it on that issue. He was one of the few 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 5004. 
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Congressmen on either side who complained bitterly about the shortages 
and high prices of food. This might have been felt more in his state of 
Oregon, although the farming element of that state must have benefited 
along with the other agricultural, or partially agricultural, states. 
In the House of Representatives, lVJ.r. Charles H. Dillon of South 
Dakota attacked President Wilson's idea of a League of Nations to follow 
the War on the floor of the House. He said: 
Let us content ourselves with the maintenance of the 
Monroe Doctrine. 'I'o extend the Monroe Doctrine over the 
nations of Europe is a visionary dream. Let us abandon 
the thought of this fatal blunder.l 
Mr. Dillon continued his speech against the arming of the ships by recom-
mending the United States join the other neutrals, in league of armed 
neutrals, and believed a victorious Germany would not be a danger to th8' 
United States. 
Representative Philip P. Campbell of Kansas, one of the leaders in 
the fight against the proposed legislation in the House, was a confirmed 
believer in "America first." In a speech before the House he strongly 
advocated keeping food and munitions at home. Among other things he 
said: 
We need the food and munitions at home. Is it useless 
to urge the necessity of conserving for our own country our 
food and our munitions of war? As between the neces-
sities of our ovm people and country and other people and 
countries is but one choice our own country.2 
Representative Campbell did not seem to care that we were not sending food 
and munitions to Germany as well as to the Allies and neutrals but believed 
lcongressional llecord, 64-2, p. 4650. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4638. 
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in keeping all of our food at home for American use. 
The opponents of the bill, who were true isolationists, did not 
care whether the Allies or Germany won the war and would have been glad 
to see the conflagration end up with neither side victorious. It was a 
11 stay out of our affairs and we will stay out of yours" concept which 
they wanted applied to all of Europe. It was somewhat of an unrealistic 
concept and not particularly applicable to the world in 1917. This group 
did not feel that a victorious Germany would be a th7eat of danger to the 
United States. They were largely uneffected by tne international law, 
rights and honor of tne United States, and preservation of democracy issues 
which came up so often in the speeches in the halls of Congress during 
the last week in February and first weeks of N~rch in 1917. 
There were a few in Congress who opposed tne bill whose prime moti-
vation seemed to be pacificism. They were opposed to war in any form and 
would have cheerfully given up cherished rights in order to avoid any 
possi:oility of being involved in the conflagration. In the Senate, James 
K. Vardaman of Mississippi, v~as the prime example of this attitude, al-
though Senator William J. Stone of w~ssouri had leanings that way. Senator 
Vardaman was an ardent admirer of William Jennings Bryan and appeared to 
be quite willing to give up all right to escape involvement. In the Senate 
he said: 
I submit it would be more profitable to tne people of 
the United States--better for the peoples of the world, 
rather than involve the United States in that war, to sus-
pend commerce between Europe and America so far as JUnerican 
shipping interests are concerned. • • • I might have a 
right to go in tne streets where a duel was being fougi1t 
by participants in a drunken mob, but it would be better 
for me if I exercised the prudence of a brave, sane man, 
and remained away from the danger zone until order should 
be restored.l 
lcongressional .iiecord, 6h-2, p. 4779. 
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IifJT. Vardaman stood by his principles and joined "the LaFollette group in 
conducting the filibuster. 
There was also some genuine pacifists in the House although, like 
the Senate, they were rather few and far between. Representative Dorsey 
W. Shackleford of 1Jiissouri was one of those whose major premise seemed 
to be opposition to any possibility of becoming involved in the war. 
He was joined in this by the Socialist Representative from New York, Meyer 
London. These men were consistent in their beliefs and up to this time 
had also voted against the appropriation bills for the Army and Navy. 
The iHlportance of the isolationist grouping is quite hard to assess. 
It can account for the actions of some of the opponents of the bill such 
as Senators Lane and Vard~~an to a considerable degree. ~~ong the many 
causes for the fight in Congress, it is believed this issue was one of 
the minor ones. While intimately connected with the more important factors 
which prevented the passage of the bill such as sectionalisnt and pressure 
and ethnic groupings, it did not, by any means, have the effect these 
other factors produced. 
INTE.tiVENTIONISlVl & INT£.B.NATIONALISM 
There was not much sentiment for direct interventionism in the 
European War either in Congress or with the people of the United States 
at the time of the President's armed ship request. The feeling was more 
of let's help the Allies and do everything we can to insure that they win 
the war. Although there were many influential persons in the country such 
as Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood who advocated open inter-
vention, the personalities in Congress who kept urging a strong stand 
against Germany such as, Senator Henry Caoot Lodge of l~ssachusetts, and 
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Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, were discreet in tneir utterances 
concerning milita~J intervention. 
There was a fairly strong sentiment in the country, particularly 
along the Atlantic seaboard, that Germany should not be allowed to win 
the war. There was a fear of German militarism. This has existed for 
sometime due to the saber rattlings of the Kaiser and some of his actions 
concerning Venezuela and other Latin American countries. This feeling 
was considerably increased when the Zimmerman note was made public. 
Many Americans began to think about what the situation might be if the 
British Navy were turned over to the Germans and how T,he Monroe Doctrine 
could be rnaintained if Germany were victorious. There were many speeches 
in Congress which touched upon this issue during the armed ship debates. 
While not a direct issue, the issue of German militarism could be found 
underlying many of the supporting speeches. 
Along with the fear of German militarism, as an underlying element 
in the support of the bill, was the thought that the Allies were fighting 
for democracy as against autocracy. This issue has been carefully fos-
tered by the British in their propaganda campaign and this, with the help 
of certain literary persons in the United States, did much to persuade their 
countrymen that Great Britain was fighting their fight.l Secretary of 
State, Robert Lansing, was one of the persons in high office who believed 
Germany was a menace to American liberties everywhere. He expressed concern 
that the American people did not perceive that German absolutism was a 
menace to their liberties and to democratic institutions everywhere.2 
lT. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 614. 
2R. Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, p. 112. 
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These feelings were present in the House and Senate in the spring of 1917, 
although often presented under some other guise. 
Senator .Albert M. Fall of New Mexico was one of the few Congressmen 
who openly advocated going to war with Germany during the armed ship con-
troversy. Speaking before the Senate on N~rch J, 1917, he said: 
1~. President, I am always frank. lf the Senate of 
the United States followed my advice it would within 15 
minutes declare a general public war against the Imperial 
German Government and authorize the President of the United 
States, as I suggested in the bill which I introduced a 
few days ago, to raise additional land forces for the de-
fense of this country.l 
However, while a great many Congressmen obviously felt the same way, they 
refused to say so in such blunt terms. 
There was much discussion of the element of national honor during 
the debates. There were many who held that the United States rrrust con-
tinue her support of shipping and not be intimidated by tne German threat. 
This was a particularly paramount issue in the South which seemed some-
what more militant than the other sections of the country. Some of the 
expressions on this matter may be seen in the Congressional Record for 
the 64th Congress: 
'l'he present bill is a bill of self-respect. A bill 
for the decent regard of our own rights and duties in the 
world, nothing more. In my judgement this bill cornes a 
month too late. It has been an intolerable spectacle to 
see our vessels, our citizens, and our mails confined in 
the ports of the United States without that measure of 
government protection to which they are unquestionably 
entitled.2 
I congratulate the President of tne United States 
for waking up on tnis question, and regret that he has 
been inactive for the last three years. • • • We will 
lCongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4870. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4644, Hepresentative J. J. Rogers, 
Massachusetts. 
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be respected throughout the world when we give the world 
to understand that no American citizen, acting v;i thin 
his rights, can be harmed or injured on any sea or in 
any foreign land.l 
'I'he protection of American honor, along with that of American 
rights, could be found in most of the speeches in favor of the proposal. 
These were fine, upstanding issues and could be upheld without question-
ing of motives. Another issue, rather loosely grouped under interven-
tionism, was the issue of protection of international law. While not 
openly advocating going to war over the point, the different interpreta-
tions of international law by Germany and the United States could not 
help but lead to some sort of a clash unless one or the other gave in. 
Senators Henry Cabot Lodge of l~ssachusetts, and Robert L. Owen 
of Oklahoma, spoke quite extensively on the matter and the need for the 
United States to uphold that law. Senator Owen declared that it was the 
right and duty of the President to observe international law and that he 
was compelled by the laws of neutrality to ;naintain it.2 The Congressmen 
in the House of Representatives were equally vociferous in demanding 
that the rules of international law be upheld and maintained. Represen-
tative Simeon D. Fess of Ohio was one of the many who spoke strongly on 
the issue .3 
The importance of the interventionist sentiment on the action of 
Congress in the armed ship controversy is like most of the other elements, 
difficult to assess. The rather intangible factors that make up this 
grouping cannot be accurately measured. That the elements of fear of 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4668, Representative R. w. Austin, 
Tennessee. 
2Ibid, p. SOlO. 
3rbid, p. 4668. 
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German militarism, national honor, upholding of international law, and 
the support for democracy were important issues which influenced the 
action of Congress certainly cannot be denied. However, their effect 
on the rank and file of Congress was considerably less than that of the 
pressure and ethnic groups and sectionalism. 
PERSONALITY FACTOR 
There are usually present in government circles of the United States 
some figures whose political actions do not fall into the standard mold. 
They are generally strong figures who have the strength of their convic-
tions in matters which make them stand out from their compatriots in the 
government. They are often reactionaries (or are branded reactionaries) 
and also are often the leaders of the party in power. They stand out above 
tne rest and are either hated or loved and never seem to be in the middle. 
It would be nonsense to say that these ;nen are not affected by the familiar 
elements of political action in the United States such as sectionalism, 
pressure groups, ethnic groups, isolationistic or internationalist trends, 
etc., but somehow on many occasions they manage to rise above the conven-
tional and to stand on their own two feet on the strength of their own 
convictions or animosities. Throughout the history of the united States 
such men as these have come to be honored or damned for their actions and 
deeds on government issues. In the analysis of the armed ship controversy, 
four personalities in the Congress, who took a prominent part, are con-
sidered to fall into this category. It is appreciated that there is 
considerable difference of opinion on this subject (and there probably 
always will be), but somehow these men in actions both at this time and 
at other times in their careers seemed to rise above the normal in their 
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influence and effect. the four personalities that are chosen because they 
stand out above the rest in their effect upon the Senate of the 64th Con-
gress are Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, George \Y. Norris of Nebraska, 
John Sharpe Williams of 1ussissippi, and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachu-
setts. vVhile there were many strong personalities in the House of Repre-
sentatives, it is not considered that any of them reach the stature of 
those listed above. 
Robert I~rion LaFollette was the avowed leader of the filibuster in 
the Senate. As a result of his action he brought a storm of critic ism 
about his head that has almost been unequalled in the history of the United 
States Congress. The question of why he did it is interesting and involved. 
LaFollette had a long and distinguished career in politics at the time of 
the filibuster. He was 62 years old at the time, in excellent health and 
had served in the Senate since 1905. Previous to his election to the 
Senate he had served three terms as the Governor of Wisconsin and prior 
to that had served for three terms in the House of Representatives of 
the United States.l At the time of the filibuster he had reached the 
height of his career and was known to have Presidential ambitions. 
In his .Autobiography, LaFollette said that his supren~ issue was 
to prevent the "encroachment of the powerful few upon the rights of the 
many • 11 It was apparently his sincere belief that the United States was 
rushing headlong into war for the shipping interests, the munitions 
interests, and other co~nercial profiteers along with the belief that 
Congress was abrogating its right to declare war if it passed the armed 
ship bill. He considered that war was being forced upon an unwilling people. 
lcongressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. 120. 
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This stand made him the subject of public abuse, denouncer11ent, and invec-
tive. His colleagues turned their backs upon him in the cloakrooms of 
the Senate; he was read out of his clubs; denounced by both Houses of the 
Congress; and it was to bring him, at last, to sit white-faced and silent 
as he listened to the Senatorial proceedings which charged him with dis-
loyalty to the government and treasonable and seditionous utterances. 
':the Senator from Wisconsin voted nis convictions and vms not 
greatly influenced by nis party or other outside influences. He favored 
lower tariffs and voted for t~ne Underwood Tariff Bill against his party 
anci his constituents. Wnen he led the heterogeneous group whicn con-
ducted the filibuster, Senator LaFollette lNas acting primarily on his own 
convictions. In opposition to the bill he strongly expressed himself: 
Shall we break the peace of the neutral half of the 
world and for what? For co~nercial advantage and fat 
profits beneficial to a limited number of our dollar-
scarred patriots; for neutral right which we surrendered 
to the belligerents on one side during the first three 
months of the war. • • • The multitudes who are dying 
in the trenches, and the millions who are suffering more 
agonizing pains at home, do not know what it is all 
about. • • • The bill is not only unconstitutional; it 
is foolish and inadequate. • • • There is no evidence 
to warrant the conclusion that arming the ships will 
afford protection.l 
LaFollette maintained his principles to the bitter end and never compro-
mised on his stand. However, it might be said that after war was declared, 
he supported the war measures which he then considered necessary after 
the irrevocable decision. 
On certain occasions one finds liberal leaders standing shoulder 
to shoulder with deep-dyed reactionaries. This was the case with George 
W. Norris when he joined forces with the filioustering group to defeat 
lLaFollette•s Magazine, March 1917. 
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the armed merchant ship bill in the Senate. Senator Norris was in his 
middle fifties and at the height of his career when he took this danger-
ous political step. He had served ten years in the House of Representa-
tives of the United States and been elected to the Senate in 1912.1 
Although generally considered to be liberal in his attitudes concerning 
internal problems of the United States, he was unalterably opposed to 
war and to United States participation in European and World affairs. 
Senator Norris objected to the bill on the grounds that Congress 
was delegating its authority to the President, that a special session 
of Congress should have been called for the bill, and that this action 
would make the President's power limitless. In speaking before the 
Senate he attacked the proposal eloquently and fiercely: 
If the President wants to keep in close touch with 
the Houses of Congress, then Congress must be in session, 
according to his own words delivered to us officially. 
Can we say that the President meant, 11 I want to be in 
close touch with you, and therefore I want you to separate 
and go to the four points of the earth? 11 • • • • We have the 
sole authority under the Constitution to declare war, and 
while this bill does not in express terw~ say that we ab-
dicate that power and turn it over to the President, it 
gives the President authority which, if he exercises it, 
takes that power away from Congress just as completely 
as if we had amended the Constitution and taken those words 
out of it. It will not answer to say the President will 
not exercise that authority. For God's sake, why give it 
to him if you do not expect him to exercise it? Others 
say the President has it now. Well, then, what is the use 
of giving it to him again in a statute. Will that make it 
any better?2 
Later on in his Autobiography, I~. Norris once again expressed his reason 
for joining the filibuster against the armed ship proposal while at the 
same time expressing his general aversion to the tactic in general: 
lcongressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. 61. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 5007. 
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I felt the passage of the proposed bill ••• would 
automatically plunge the United States into the War •••• 
Feeling so strongly, I felt the filibuster was justified 
in spite of my repugnance to the method.l 
In the uproar following the defeat of the proposal, the filibuster-
ing group was castigated by the President, by all sections of the press, 
by political leaders, by various clubs and groups, and in general by most 
of the United States. Senator Norris took a step which indicated his 
strong character and personal integrity when he publically offered to 
submit his action in opposing the arming of iunerican merchant ships to 
the judgement of the voters of Nebraska on a special election. He would 
resign if the vote went against him.2 This was indicative of a man of 
the stature of Norris and his continuance in the Senate to represent the 
voters of Nebraska for many more years indicated their faith and belief 
in him. 
John Sharpe Vvilliams, Senator from Mississippi, was another who rose 
above the standard political pressure groups and parties to support mea-
sures and issues that his party had not espoused. The fact that he was 
from a one party state may have had something to do with this as political 
reprisals at the polls were hard to arrange, but in general he voted as 
his conscience dictated. At this time he was 63 years of age and a long-
time veteran of Congressional foibles. He had served through eight terms 
in the House of Representatives and was starting his second term in the 
Senate.3 Needless to say, he was a Democrat and thus a member of the 
President• s party. 
lB. M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle, p. 375. 
2New ~epublic, March 24, 1917, p. 211. 
3congressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. 53. 
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Senator Williams made known his views on partisan issues on many 
occasions. When he spoke in Congress on March 14, 1922, he said: 
Mr. President, I am a Democrat, a Bourbon Democrat, 
a plain blamed-fool Mississippi Democrat. I have no 
patience with Republicans and I have no patience with 
partisanship in connection with international affairs.l 
Concerning minority pressure groups he also said, at the same time, of 
the Four Power Treaty discussions: 
It is a great pity that Great Britain is a party 
to it, because if she were not, all the German-American 
and Irish-American opposition to it would have ceased 
long ago.2 
Later in the 80th Congress he again expressed himself: 
I did not come here as a Democrat necessarily, because 
we have only an insignificant number of Republicans in my 
district, so I do not have to vote along partisan lines. 
I vote as my conscience tells me and I do not intend to go 
into this thing blindfolded.3 
Senator Williams strongly supported the armed ship bill in the 
Senate. He believed in it and felt that it should be enacted into law. 
When it appeared likely that the small group of twelve would possibly 
succeed in preventing a vote, he expressed himself vitriolicly as 
follows: 
lv'lr. President, one of the most humiliating spectacles 
in the course of illnerican history will be presented if there 
be an adjournment of this Congress and this bill, whether 
amended or unamended, with this object and with this purpose 
in view, shall have been defeated by the United States 
Senate. It will be the most humiliating page in the history 
of the Senate itself. • • • The President has awakened to the 
fact that American honor and American self-respect are at 
stake; the House has awakened; the country has awakened; and 
here stands a corporal's guard of men who deny to me, the 
Senator of a sovereign state--to you, the Senator from apother, 
the right to express our opinion by a vote in this body.4 
lG. 1. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress, p. 62. 
2Ibid. 
3J. Turner, Party and Constituency, Pressures ~Congress, p. 178. 
4congressional Record, 6h-2, p. 4991. 
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Mr. Williams fought hard for the passage of the bill but his efforts were 
to no avail as the members of the filibustering group were adamant. 
Another personage who seemed to stand out ·above the rank and file 
was Henry Cabot Lodge, the author and 11 scholar 11 of the Senate. While 
Lodge was later to hate Woodrow Wilson with a consuming bitterness and 
to attack and defeat the proposals for the United States to join the 
League of Nations and to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, he, at this 
time, supported the President. Senator Lodge was a strong personality 
and the acknowledged authority on international law in the Senate in 
the spring of 1917. 
Mr. Lodge was the senior Republican in the Senate and hence minor-
ity leader. He had served eight years in the House and was then serving 
his fifth term in the Senate.l Had Senator Lodge not supported the 
President's proposal, there might have been considerable partisan pressure 
built up against it. However, the Republicans had been for firmer action 
against Germany in earlier years and it would have been ratner difficult 
for them to reverse their stand. Mr. Lodge, while not extre;nely voracious 
in supporting the bill, did express himself in its favor as follows: 
I am going to vote to give the President the power 
which I think he ought to have in answering his request; 
then the responsibility is his. I would not have Congress 
refuse what he asks when this country is at odds with a 
foreign nation. ~fuen I give I am going to give freely; 
I am not willing to tie strings to the gift; I a.rn not 
going to send it to the President with statements which 
I think would show an utter lack of faith in his purposes 
and intentions. If I am going to give at all I am going 
to give freely; I am going to give the President what he 
wants.2 
lcongressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. 44. 
2congressional hecord, 64-2, p. h75L 
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It is ir.teresting to surmise what would have been t.lle out come of the 
armed ship bill in the Senate if lvir. Lodge had actively opposed it. 
CONGitESSlONA.L LE.tJJE.H.S l<'AVOiilNG 'l't1E .tiiLL--hOUSii:; OF li.SPi-t.:t!:dJ~i\Li.'i'lVES 
One of the most important, if not the most important considerations 
in a Congressional squabble is the caliber of the leadership. This was 
particularly true in the fight to arm the merchant ships. 'I'he leadership 
in the House was strong, coordinated and dedicated to the purpose of 
getting the bill passed in accordance with the wishes of President Wilson. 
Leadership, as is often the case with individual bills, did not follow 
party lines and was not exercised through the established cnannels, i.e., 
the majority and minority leaders and the various whips, etc. 'l'he leader-
ship in the House was strictly non-partisan and a cogoination of efforts, 
led by the Chairman of tr1e Committee on Foreign Affairs, Henry D. Flood 
of Virginia. 
It was largely due to the organizational efforts of fuir. Flood that 
the bill went through the House without a great deal of difficulty. The 
request of Mr. Wilson was referred to the Conunittee on Foreign Affairs 
and Mr. Flood promptly came up with a bill embodying tne necessary 
authority and presented it to the House for action and amendment. His 
astute leadership was everywhere present and it can be said with surety 
that he was the rtepresentative most responsible for its success. There 
is little doubt that rllr. Flood believed sincerely in what he was doing. 
In speaking before the House, he insisted that the United States rrrust 
protect its ships and its citizens; that it must protect American lives, 
uphold American honor, and make Germany pay for any losses .1 In a state-
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 5637. 
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ment to the press vrhich appeared in the New York times, Current History 
lil8.gazine he reiterated his stand as follows: 
Germany, he said, had violated the promises made in 
the interchange of notes between ti1e tJni ted States and 
that nation, and she is now underta1dng to destroy every 
merchant vessel, whether belligerent or neutral, that is 
undertaking to land at any port of Great Britain or Ire-
land, on the Atlantic coast, or eastern ports of the 
Mediterranean. The Am.erican merchant Marine is tied up 
in our harbors and .American Commerce is blockaded in our 
ports as effectually as if an enerrw had blockaded those 
ports. This condition is intolerable to a free and a 
brave people, and it has continued as long as the Ameri-
can Government and the American people are willing to 
submit to it. The pending bill gives the President the 
means to remedy this intolerable condition and free our 
commerce and protect the lives of fu~erican citizens in 
their lawful pursuits on the high seas.l 
The majority leader in the House, Claude Kitchen of North Carolina, sup-
ported the bill but only in a limited sense. His expressions of support 
were only lukewarm and one gets the impression that if the bill had been 
proposed by a Republican President, ~~. Kitchen would have been in op-
position or at least neutral. In contrast to lVir. Kitchen, one can find 
the minority leader of the House, Mr. James R. Iviann of Illinois, in strong 
support of the proposal. If this had not been so, then it is considered 
the bill might have had a much tougher and more controversial treatment 
on the floor of the House of Representatives. In expressing strong sup-
port Mr. Mann said: 
I long ago would have given the President of the United 
States the power to protect against unlawful attacks the 
citizens of the United States engaged in lawful and peaceful 
persuits in the Republic of Mexico and I believe we ought to 
give him the power now to save our rights, our dignity, our 
people, our patriotism, and our Nation; and I hope and I be-
lieve that in giving this power to the President we are more 
apt to keep out of war than we are to have a declaration of 
lNew York Times, Current History Magazine, P• 50. 
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war. I hope we will not have to declare war. I do not 
want to become involved in the European wari but I am 
willing to protect the rights of Americans. 
The actions of Mr. Mann in the House did a great deal, as did those of 
Senator Lodge in the Senate, to keep the party issue almost entirely out 
of the controversy. Had he opposed the bill instead of being one of the 
strong supporters, it is probable that a considerable number of the 199 
Republicans in the House would have been influenced. 
Representative John Jacob Rogers of lv1assachusetts was one of the 
most vocal and rather rabid leaders in getting the bill approved in the 
House. He verged on being an interventionist and claimed that the bill 
was not strong enough, that the President should have taken stronger 
action than to request authority to arm merchant ships.2 Ntr. Rogers, a 
lawyer from Harvard, insisted the bill was already too late and that the 
United States could do nothing less and keep its self-respect. 
J. Charles Linthicom of Maryland spoke long and loudly in favor of 
the proposal. He demanded that action be taken to protect the commerce 
of the United States and to give the President the backin~ he had asked 
for and deserved.3 Mr. Linthicum recited the 11 Star Spangled Banner" in 
one of his emotional speeches, but whether this accomplished anything is 
unknown. The commercial interests of Baltimore (Mr. Linthicum's home 
district) may have had much to do with his strong defense of the protection 
of shipping and commerce. 
There were many other leaders in the House of Representatives who 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4640. 
2Ibid., p. 4644. 
3Ibid., p. 4645. 
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aided and supported the proposal to arm American merchant shipping. 
Generally the reasons given were similar or identical to those already 
advanced. It would be somewhat repetitious to present these reasons 
individually as they fall within the listings already presented in 
Chapter II. Among the leaders were: 
William s. Bennett, Republican, New York 
Robert 1. Henry, Democrat, Texas 
Henry I. Emerson, Republican, Ohio 
Henry W. Temple, Republican, Pennsylvania 
J. Thomas Heflin, Democrat, Alabama 
Thomas W. Miller, Democrat, Delaware 
Richard W. Austin, Republican, Tennessee 
It might be noted that of the leaders supporting the bill only one 
came from west of the 1\Ussissippi. He was from Texas. The Atlantic 
seaboard provided the majority of the leaders, the industrial East having 
the most and the South the next greatest number. The Lake States provided 
two while none came from the Great Plains, Rocky Mountains, or Pacific 
Coast. 
CONGRESSIONAL LEADE...'i.S FAVOB.lNG '!'HE BILL--SENATE 
It was unfortunate for the President of the United States that the 
leadership in the Senate was not up to the caliber of that in the House. 
While that in the House was determined, strong, aggressive, intelligent, 
and above all, united, the same cannot be said for the Senate. Where the 
House was united, the Senate was split. There was no one to shepherd the 
bill through the Senate with the same finess showed by Mr. Flood of 
Virginia, and the same unity of approach shown by both Republican and 
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Democratic leaders in the House. A considerable portion of the difference 
may be attributed to the different rules of the two Houses of Congress 
but a greater difference was the resoluteness of the leadership. It is 
now apparent that if the leadership under :tv!r. Hitchcock had held firm on 
the night of March 2, the filibuster would have failed due to the length 
of time remaining in the Session. When the Senate recessed until the 
next morning, the filibustering group knew they had succeeded. It might 
be said for the Senate leadership that the defection of Mr. Stone to the 
other side hurt their cause considerably as to strategy and unity of 
purpose. 
The senior Senator from Nebraska, Gilbert Ivl. Hitchcock, became the 
primary leader of the Administration forces on the afternoon of March 2, 
when Senator Stone joined the forces of LaFollette. lVJI'. Hitchcock was the 
second senior Democrat on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and 
succeeded to the leadership on the bill when ivli'. Stone, the Chairman of 
that Committee, decided to oppose it. Senator Hitchcock was not particu-
larly strong for the proposal. He seemed to reflect more the attitude of 
the Midwest and while probably doing his best as party leader to carry 
out tne wishes of the Chief Executive did not display any strength of 
purpose or dynamic leadership. He expressed confidence in the President 
and suggested that the arming of the ships was the safest course and least 
likely to lead to war.l It might be said that ~rr. Hitchcock was a tried 
and true party man and followed the orders of his party leadership. 
Among the leaders in support of the bill in the Senate was Thomas 
'N. Hardwick of Georgia. Senator Hardwick spoke many times in support of 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 5017. 
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the measure and lei't no doubt as to how he stood. His reasons for support 
were that he considered it necessary to preserve peace, to protect the 
rights of American citizens, and tile surest way to peace was to prepare 
to maintain rights.l lVlr. Hardwick also considered tnat Mr. Wilson already 
had the right to arm the ships. In speaking to the Senate of ~arch 3, he 
maintained: 
The President of the United States, by virtue of his 
inherent powers, conferred on him by the Constitution as 
Commander in Chief of the Ar~ and Navy of the United States 
and as the Chief Executive of this great Nation, in which 
all executive power is lodged, has the natural, the inherent 
right to protect citizens of the United States against wrong 
and injury and unlawful attack whenever and wherever such wrong, 
injury, or unlawful attack may threaten.2 
He was joined in this belief by several other Senators as well as by the 
President himself. In the Senate, Senators Walsh of illontana, a...1d Suther-
land of Utah, supported this view of the Presidential powers. 
About the most voluble of the Senate leaders was Frank Brandegee 
of Connecticut. As has previously been mentioned, this gentleman was 
much concerned over the tie-up of shipping on the coastal ports of the 
United States and he was strongly in favor of getting the ships moving. 
He firmly believed in protecting United States shipping and said in the 
Senate on March 3, that the only distinction between what exists and real 
war is that Germany is waging war and we decline to defend ourselves.3 
Two of tne Senate leaders have been discussed under the "personality" 
heading and it is not believed necessary or desirable to repeat their 
stands and why they took the sa...~e. These are Senators Lodge of V~ssachusetts 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4906. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid.' p. 4868. 
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and Williams of Mississippi. Both supported the bill for tne reasons 
already given. 
In addition to those already mentioned, several Senators from wide 
spread areas ranged themselves alongside the ~astern leaders and took an 
active part in attempting to get the bill through the Senate. Two of 
these who seemed to exert the most influence were Thomas J. iYalsh of 
lviontana and .Albert B. Fall of New Mexico. Senator Walsh believed the 
President should be given firm backing of Congress while Senator Fall 
was an ardent interventionist. 
'l'he leadership in the Senate was not united and lacked cohesion. 
Whether stronger leadership could have gotten the bill passed is, of 
course, a matter for conjecture; but except for the one tactical mis-
take made by Ntr. Hitchcock, it is not believed a united leadership would 
have succeeded. The Republicans cooperated with the Democrats and by 
normal standards the bill should have passed. However, conditions were 
not normal and the leadership possibly overlooked the tenacity of the 
LaFollette group. 
CONGliESSIONAL LEaDERS OPPOSlNG THE BILL--HOUSE OF B.EPRE.SEHTR.TlVES 
When the armed merchant ship bill was voted on in the House of 
Representatives, the results were overwhelmingly in favor of passage.l 
This might seem to indicate there was no coordinated opposition in the 
House but that was not the case. As was stated previously in this 
treatise, it is considered the vote to recommit taken just before the 
final vote on passage is a better indication of the true sentiment in 
the House than the final roll call. This vote v1as 125 yeas, 293 nays, 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4691--yeas 403, nays 14, not voting 17. 
68 
with 16 not voting. While better than a two to one majority, it does 
not indicate the lack of opposition that one might believe existed by 
reference to the final vote. There were lll Representatives who changed 
their votes when it was made apparent that the bill was going to pass. 
The opposition to the bill was generally based in the Middle 1iest and 
Great Plains states with considerable support from the Rocky Mountains 
and Pacific Coast. All the leaders in the group were from the Great 
Plains area. In general the issues of sectionalism, agricultural pres-
sure, ethnic pressure, and pacificism see1ned to be the dominent factors 
affecting the leadership. 
The opposition to President Wilson's proposal was led by Repre-
sentative Henry S. Cooper of vVisconsin, a veteran of twelve successive 
terms in tne House of Representatives and the senior Republican in the 
House next to "Uncle Joe Cannon," former Speaker. Mr. Cooper considered 
the bill would give the war power of Congress to the President and be-
lieved the bill amounted to a declaration of war. He apparently con-
sidered the actions of the British in regard to their blockade to be 
equally as disadvantageous to runerican rights and shipping as the German 
action. In general, he represented the sectional attitude of the large 
pro-German elements of his native state of Wisconsin. Among other an-
nouncernents on March 1, he quoted Woodrow Wilson in a speech on the floor 
of the House: 
I am opposed to granting to a President more power to 
endanger the peace of the country than is already given him 
by the Constitution. That a President has such power is the 
view of President Wilson himself in his book, Congressional 
Government, published in 1885: "His (the President's) orily 
power OI compelling compliance on the part of the Senate 
lies in his initiative in negotiations, which affords him a 
chance to get tne country into such scrapes, that the Senate 
hesitates to bring about the appearance of dishonor wnich 
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would follow its refusal to ratify the rash promises or 
to support the indiscreet threats of the Department of 
State.l 
Aligned with Mr. Cooper in his leadership of the opposition in the 
House of Representatives was Democrat Dorsey Yv. Shackleford of Missouri. 
I~. Shackleford, a veteran of nine successive terms in the House, was 
somewhat of a pacifist and believed tnat a strong war party existed in the 
United States. He was strongly opposed to war and believed the arming 
of the merchant ships would be an act of war. As a member of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, he had tried unsuccessfully to amend the 
legislation while in the Committee. In the debate in the House, he 
said: 
From the beginning in the European war until now there 
has been in this country a war party. It has demanded from 
the first that we should go into the European war on the 
side of the allies, to assist them in the spreading of the 
cause of democracy over the world as they express it. That 
party has been backed up by a sinister press which from the 
beginning until now has been clamoring for war. • • • Those 
of us who may not favor going to war are denounced as 
traitors, as poltroons, as cowards.2 
Additional leaders in the House who aided Cooper and Shackleford in 
the fight against the arming proposal were: 
Philip P. Campbell, rtepublican, Kansas 
Perl D. Decker, Democrat, 1tissouri 
Charles S. Dillon, nepublican, South Dakota 
Henry T. Helgeson, Hepublican, North Dakota 
These gentlemen all represented the general attitudes of the areas from 
which elected to the Congress. In general they took the position of 
being pro-German and anti-British, isolationistic, not in favor of uphold-
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4654. 
2rbid., p. 4642. 
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ing international law, and the belief that tne proposal amounted to a 
declaration oi' war. All the leaders of the group came from tne same 
general area of the country and seemed to follow the same pattern in 
their ideas and expressions. 
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OPPOSING THE BILL--SENATE 
In the last analysis concerning leadership there is one question 
which does more than any other to show the results of that leadership. 
'l'his is the question, "Vias it successful? 11 In the case of the filibuster 
there is only one answer--an unqualified yes. One may malign the motives 
of the group, may call them traitors or any equally unsavory names but 
it is difficult to criticize the resourcefulness, the intelligence or the 
effectiveness of this leadership. A great deal of the credit must, of 
course, go to the leader and organizer of the filibuster, Senator LaFollette 
of Vhsconsin. He, more than any other, was responsible for the success 
of this venture and, as was fitting, reaped the w:nirlwind of invective 
that followed. Next in line to "fighting Bob 11 must co;ne George Norris 
of Nebraska. Senator Norris worked hand in glove with Lalollette to set 
up the filibuster and to keep it going when it started. Tnese two persons 
were the foremost and recognized leaders of the "little group of wilful 
men" who stood by their principles in spite of Presidential, Congressional, 
press, and public pressure. As Senators LaFollette and Norris have been 
discussed under the heading of strong personalities, it is not considered 
desirable to repeat tneir stands and positions taken. rlather the remain-
der of the section will be devoted to the other leaders who made consider-
able contributions to the filibuster. 
Senator 'i'lilliam J. Stone of iviissouri was tne best knovm and most 
effective leader of the opposition group in the Senate next to the two 
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primary leaders. 1vlr. Stone was chairman of the influential Committee on 
E'oreign .ti.elations and introduced bill S 8322 into the Senate. Early 
indications were that he would foster the bill and attempt to get it 
passed into law. Apparently, Mr. Stone did considerable soul-searching 
and on March 2, decided to actively opnose t:ne proposal to arm the 
merchant ships. 'l'he sponsorship of the bill was accordingly turned over 
to lvir. Hitchcock of Nebraska, the next senior Democrat on the Committee. 
On N~rch 3, Senator Stone spoke for four hours against the proposed 
legislation. He attacked it on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, 
that Congress was abdicating its authority and dodging its responsibili-
ties, that it would authorize the President to declare vrar, and that it 
would work to the advantage of war profiteers. He also, and I believe he 
was alone in this, feared the rise of British militarism if the Allies 
should win the war. Among other things in this long speech, he quoted 
the entire Farewell .Address of Washington. Several of IVJT. Stone's state-
ments are quoted: 
I believe the bill to be not only violative of the 
Constitution--destructive of one of the most important 
powers vested in the Congress, the war making power--but 
that its passage would set a precedent fraught with future 
danger to our form of government and to public liberty •••• 
It is said that this power, if granted, would not 
authorize the President to initiate war; but I say it woulct.l 
The action of ~lT. Stone was one of the turning points in the Senate fight. 
He had considerable influence in the Senate. His defection strengthened 
the stand of the LaFollette group. 
Senator Albert B. Cummins was another of the leading lights in the 
defeat of the armed ship bill. Senator Cummins had been Governor of Iowa 
1congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4878. 
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for eight years and was serving his second term as United States Senator. 
lvlr. Cummins apparently believed that Congress would be divesting itself 
of its authority and granting too much power to the President if the legis-
lation were to pass. He seemed to think that President Nilson was assuming 
too much power and that he nad aspirations to be some sort of a dictator. 
In the Senate, he expressed himself as being opposed to "kaiserizing 11 the 
United States.l It might be mentioned that Senators Cummins and Stone made 
attempts to amend the armed ship bill when it still had a chance to pass. 
A transplanted Middle Westerner, Senator John D. Works, of Califor-
nia, took a stand against the bill and served as one of the leaders in the 
filibuster. While serving in the Senate from California, he had spent the 
first thirty-six years of his life in Indiana and seemed to have an isola-
tionistic attitude which is often associated with that section. WIT. Works 
did not believe the government should go to war or become in any way involved 
in any altercations for the rights of a few citizens.2 In addition, he, 
like some of the others of the filibustering group, seemed to believe 
that Congress would be abrogating some of its power to the President if 
the bill became law. Ntr. Works was particularly incensed at the "manifesto 
of the 75 11 and regarded it as a deed unbefitting the Senate. 
Among those who were heart and soul in the filibuster and actively 
supported it were the following: 
William F. Kirby, Democrat, Arkansas 
James K. Vardaman, Democrat, r;.lississippi 
Moses E. Clapp, Republican, Minnesota 
Asle J. Gronna, liepublican, North Dakota 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4912. 
2Ibid., p. 4997. 
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These gentlemen opposed the bill for various reasons, all of which have 
been covered. They might with the possible exception of Mr. Vardaman who 
was pretty much of a pacifist, be loosely considered somewhat pro-German, 
sectional, and reactionary in their conduct. 
DIFF:ri:RENCES IN HOUSE AND SENA'l'E ACT IOl~ 
It has often been said that while the House watches the purse, the 
Senate watches the President. The Senate is charged with certain responsi-
bilities of examining and advising on foreign affairs by the Constitution 
which makes it necessary that all treaties must be ratified by the Senate. 
The Senators take this responsibility seriously and are fully aware of 
their importance as individual solons. 'l'he tradition of liberal discussion 
and the more relaxed procedure permit Senators to tinker with proposed 
policy to the point of altering it beyond all recognition or nullifying 
it altogether. An interesting example of this was the Senate action on 
the Treaty of Versailles and tne League of Nations. By the time Senator 
Lodge had put all his conditions on it, it was so altered that it was 
unacceptable to President Wilson. This tradition has led the people of 
the United States to expect unusual or sensational developments from the 
Senate and they have not usually been disappointed. Thus one could say 
that the Senate action on the armed ship bill was in the tradition of that 
body. The armed ship filibuster became one of the most notorious of Senate 
filibusters. From the year 1865 to 1946, thirty-seven major bills (exclu-
sive of appropriation bills) were beaten in the Senate in this manner.l 
With its large membership the House has neither the time nor place 
lB. M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle, p. 374. 
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for outstanding statesmen to prove their worth through long discussion. 
The chamber procedure is better mechanized and the leaders can spot 
obstructionar,v tactics much earlier and take action to parry them. Not 
having Constitutional authority with regard to approving Presidential 
actions on foreign affairs, the House generally gives these actions prompt 
and favorable consideration. This has been particularly true in recent 
years and was certainly true regarding the armed ship bill. Unanimous 
agreement to limit debate to three hours was obtained in the House in a 
matter of hours, while in the Senate it was never obtained. This does 
not rooan that the House did not regard the proposal as vitally important 
but rather emphasizes a difference in tradition and procedure. Had this 
been an appropriation bill, the House would have no douot perused it care-
fully and diligently and taken a great deal more tiJOO. 
'!'he lack of a cloture rule in the Senate, at this time, aided the 
insurgent group. They were only limited by their physical strength to 
stand, and to talk. The House operating under a set of rules which 
provides for the limitation of general debate could prevent the condi-
tion under which the Administration leaders found themselves in the 
Senate. 
The biennial term of the Representatives is another difference be-
tween the House and Senate which probably affected the action on the armed 
ship bill. The Representatives know that they rnust face their constituents 
every two years and not ever,v six years. Thus they are more apt to have 
their finger on the pulse of the general public and to hesitate to go 
against what they think the people favor. In general, the people of the 
United States were favorable to the bill as shown by the strong support 
given it by the various clubs, organizations, newspapers, and periodicals. 
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This, to a large degree, accounts for the large shift in votes from the 
motion to recommit to the vote to pass and get on the winning side. 
The size of the two chambers also influences their actions on 
legislation. The House, being over four times as large as the Senate, 
cannot permit the same falderal to go on or nothing would get done. If 
it did the House might be rendered completely impotent to act as the 
Senate, in the last days of the 64th Congress. As the House represents 
the people rather than the states, t11e larf;e number of members from the 
highly populated East made favorable action more likely on the armed 
ship bill. This insured a sizeable majority for the proposal when it was 
introduced and prevented a large opposition block from the Great Plains 
area, which is sparsely settled and accordingly has few Representatives 
in the House. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In analyzing the political factors involved in the armed ship 
controversy, the only clear and distinct conclusion is that they are 
all related and inter-related. There were some, of course, that had 
greater influence than others although attempting to list them in any 
order of priority seems to be slightly foolhardy for anyone less than a 
political expert. However, I will express my opinion as to which had 
considerable effect and which had little effect. 
There can be little doubt that the elements of sectionalism, 
pressure groups, personality, and leadership played a leading part in 
the House and in the Senate. On the other hand the elements of political 
partizanship, ethnic groupings, isolationism, interventionism, and inter-
nationalism were less important and in a few cases the total effect might 
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be even discounted. The lines were split generally on a sectional basis 
with tne pressure groups being closely inter-related witn their respective 
sections. The strongest supcort for the bill came fro;n the industrial 
East with its bankers, munition makers, con1merce, etc., with the important 
opposition coming from the agricultural Great Plains areas along lines 
which have existed and probably will exist for many years. 
The personality factor was also one of great Lnportance, particu-
larly in the Senate, when one thinks of 11.obert Lafollette and George l\lorris. 
Without these great individualists, and strong characters, it is quite 
likely that the bill might have gotten Senate approval with li t-Lle ;nore 
trouole than was experienced in the House. The c:>ersonali-cy factor is also 
tied in with the important leadership consj_deration. The superior leader-
ship in the House as well as the differences in size, rules, tradition, 
etc., had mucn to do with the outcome of tne struggle in that chamber. 
While not meaning to discount these elements, it is not considered 
that the party issue or ethnic groupings had a great influence upon the 
struggle. 'l'he same might be said of the desire to remain clear of Europe 
and the desire to take our place as a grea'c,, large, and i:rrportant nation 
of the world. 'l'here were a few for immediate wqr Ritn Germany and a few 
for avoidance of war at any price in both Houses of Congress at the time. 
While quite important in other phases of World War I, tl:1e opposing issues 
of isolationism and internationalism in the armed snip bill fight were 
relatively minor. 
The moral issue influenced a great many Americans and hence 
Congressmen. Under this facade were the twin elements of upholding 
international law and the rights and honor of Americans. This issue was 
often interwoven with the more material and tangible factors and in some 
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ways provided a moral sheen to these factors. The Congressmen from the 
South were influenced more than those of other areas and accounts in large 
measure for the very strong support that area gave to tlle bill. 
If called upon to name the most important element in the success 
of the bill in the house, I believe it would be the leadership of the 
pro-Administration group under Itr. Flood. Closely following that factor 
would be the influence of pressure groups and sectionalism. In the Sen-
ate, the most important factor in the filibuster and defeat of the bill 
was the personality of the leaders. The success of the filibuster may 
be attributed to the strength and individuaiism of Senators LaFollette 
and Norris more than anything else. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONTROVERSY 
The defeat of the armed ship bill was by no means accepted by the 
President or by the country as a whole. In a public statement given out 
to the press on the evening of March 4, Wilson said: 
Although as a matter of fact the Nation and the 
representatives of the Nation stand back of the Executive 
with unprecedented unanimity and spirit, the impression 
made abroad will of course be that it is not so, and 
that other Governments may act as they please without 
fear that this Government can do anything at all. VVe 
cannot explain: the explanation is incredible. The 
Senate of the United States is the only legislative body 
in the world which cannot act when the majority is 
ready for action. A little group of wilful men, repre-
senting no opinion but their own, have rendered the 
great government of the United States helpless and con-
temptible. 
The remedy? There is but one remedy. The only 
remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so 
altered that it can act. 'l'he country can be relied upon 
to draw the moral. I believe the Senate can be relied 
on to supply the means of action and save the country 
from disaster.l 
The words of the President were mild however, compared to the 
editorial attacks of the newspapers of the nation. The little group of 
Senators were relentlessly polloried and condemned by abusive language. 
The New York World for instance denounced "the wretches in the Senate, 
• envious, pusillanimous, or abandoned. They have denied their 
country's conscience and courage in order to make a Prussian holiday. 
• • • They are delinquents and dastards." The New York Herald stated, 
"The President's excoriation merely reflects the sentiment of the people 
••• but it should be stronger. Senator rlobert LaFollette and others 
lR. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
p. 435. 
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in an hour of grave national peril have given aid and comfort to Prussian-
ism. Fortunate will these men be if their names do not go down in history 
bracketed with that of Benedict Arnold." The Utica Press said, 11It is 
nothing short of a sin and a shame. Those who occasion delay deserve 
the denunciation to be hurled at them from eve~J quarter of the United 
States." The Providence Journal declared the tactics of the filibuster 
group "were little short of treason." The Eartford Courant said they 
were a "few political tramps." The Pittsburgh Dispatch deplored "this 
humiliating national spectacle • 11 The Memphis Co;runercial Appeal declared, 
"The American Republic is jeopardized. • • the liberty of American peo-
ple is betrayed. • • • Our Kaiserbund is already formed with these 
Senators as leaders • 11 While the St. Louis Globe-Democrat called Senator 
Stone, "the shame of the country and particularly of the State he so 
unworthily represents. 11 The press, almost without exception, demanded 
a revision of the Senate rules to prevent such a thwarting of the will 
of the majority in the future.l The Outlook magazine ran an article in 
the March 14 issue entitled, "The Disloyal Senators," which states: 
To withstand this will of the majority in Congress 
was to do the will of Germany. By thwarting the will of 
the majority, the Senators who prevented a vote on the 
bill authorizing the President to arm American merchant 
ships became Germany's tools and allies. 'l'hey have humili-
ated us before the world. They have violated the unwritten 
laws of all reputable deliberative assemblies. They have 
been disloyal to their country at a time of inuninent peril. 
They should never again be intrusted by the American peo-
ple with public office.2 
The above excerpts indicate how far the tide of public opinion had 
risen since the election of the previous November. Notice was served to 
lThe New York Times, March 5, 1917, printed a number of co:rnments 
presumea-to-ne representative of the press of the country. 
2The Outlook Magazine, 11/larch 14, 1917, p. 451. 
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the recalcitrant Senators to conform to the majority. Any Senator look-
ing to his political future would not mistake the warning. The legis-
latures of the country began to rnake themselves heard in resolutions, 
threats of discipline, and censure. Oregonians demanded the resignation 
of Senator Lane, "Oregon's traitorJ' and recall proceedings were put into 
motion. The legislatures of many states moved to condemn the tactics 
of the filibusterers, among them being Colorado, 'l'ennessee, Kentucky, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. From all over tne country came 
such a wave of denunciation that the recalcitrant Senators began to back 
down. 1iJlany minimized their part in the filibuster, calling attention to 
the fact that they spoke only so many minutes against the bill. Senators 
Stone and LaFollette, alone, ciid not ma!ce :.my excuses and s-cood adamant 
against the storm.l 
On the evening of March 5, a mass meeting of 3,0JO citizens gathered 
in Carnegie Hall in New York City and pledged unqualified support to the 
fresident. iihen the speakers referred to tne twelve Senators who thwarted 
the will of the executive, shouts of 11 traitors" and "hang themn greeted 
their na;nes. hesolutions were adopted condemning the 11pacifist .:lenators" 
in unmeasured terms. That same evening Senator LaB'ollette was hanged in 
effigy by students of the University of Illinois. Prominent men a;~ong 
the clergy found a place in their sermons to excoriate pacifists in gen-
eral and filibustering Senators in particular. 
LIMITED CLOTURE COMES TO THE SENATE 
President Wilson in his speech on the evening of the adjournment 
of Congress had vehemently demanded that -che Senate provide some sort of 
lNew York Times, March 6-10, 1917. 
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limitation of debate. on crucial legislation. He pointed out the number 
of bills such as the Army appropriation, the shipping board legislation, 
the conservation bill, and many others had been prevented from being 
passed by the filibuster in addition to the armed ship bill. 'i'he Fresi-
dent was not alone in this as the nation's press and many prominent 
leaders loudly demanded that some sort of cloture come to the Senate. 
The Sixty-fifth Congress, the Senate of which convened in special 
session at noon on the fifth of lVlarch, was to become one of the most 
important of bodies that ever sat in Washington and was to witness some 
of the most acrimonious debates ever heard in the halls of Congress. 
At this time several of the filibustering group, anmng them being Sena-
tors Gronna and Kenyon, protested against the implication that they had 
filibustered the armed ship bill to death. Senator Lodge introduced on 
the sixth of March a new armed ship bill to give the President power to 
supply arms to merchant ships.l This bill was practically identical with 
the bill which had been so lately defeated and was sent to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations where it was to remain. There seemed little need 
to rush this bill through as the House was not in session and would not 
be until April second. 
Senator Ivlartin of Virginia, the Senate ivJ.ajority Leader, on March 7, 
introduced a resolution on limiting debate in the Senate. Senator 
LaFollette spoke long and vehemently against the resolution and declared 
that the hysteria of the moment ·was driving Senators to do what they would 
normally resist with all their hearts.2 The Senate acted promptly on 
lcongressional Record, 65-Special, p. 20. 
2r· ·d ~·' p. 41. 
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the issue and the resolution was adopted by a vote of 76 to 3. 'l':qose voting 
against were LaFollette, Gronna, and Sherman. The Literary Digest described 
the cloture as follows: 
On March eighth, the Senate, by a vote of 73-3, 
surrendered its priviledge of unlimited debate, which 
it had defended against all assaults for more than 100 
years, and adopted a closure rule whereby, on a vote 
of two-thirds of the members, debate can be limited to 
a maximum of ninety-six hours, or one hour for each 
Senator.l 
1'HE SHIPS A...'ili .Ail..lvl.t!:D BY PrlESIDENTIAL FiWCLAlvlA'l'lON 
President Wilson by his earlier writings and his address to Congress 
on the arming of merchant ships believed that he had constitutional power 
to place the arms upon these ships. It was now apparent that quick action 
could not be taken by Congress and the thing to do appeared to be to arm 
them by procla."'lation. The only restriction appeared to be the old npirate 
law of 1819. n 
This law prohibited the President from permitting any merchant vessel 
of American registry to use force against the ships of a nation with which 
the United States was not officially at war. This law specified that 
armed merchant vessels should not use their guns against national vessels 
of a government with which the United States was in amity. 2 
There was much discussion of the Presidential power at this time. 
The Outlook magazine claimed that the President had this right and could 
authorize the ships to be armed in the same manner as private citizens 
in a city can be allowed to carry revolvers.3 The New Republic called 
lLiterary Digest, l~rch 17, 1917, p. 96. 
2New York Times, Current History Magazine, p. 55. 
3The Outlook, N~rch 14, 1917, p. 445. 
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the law a "moth eaten barrier" to the Presidential powers.l The Indepen-
dent argued that the statute applied to the recognized right of visit and 
search, but did not apply to unlawful attempts to sink rnercnant ships 
without warning, that since we had broken relations vnth Germany the two 
nations were not in amity. lt also asserted that Germany, as a foreign 
power, could not claim benefits of domestic legislation of this country 
except where principles of international law were involved.2 
President lfilson was urged to take tne step by Secretary of State, 
Robert Lansing. He was assured by Attorney-General Gregory that he had 
the legal authority although he had previously declared and believed that 
he had this power. The arming of the merchant shiDs by Presidential 
proclamation was forecast by Presidential Secretary Joseph 'l'umulty on 
March 9, when he said the President would have an important message in 
regard to the arming of American merchant ships in a few days. Accordingly 
on .March 12, President Wilson gave the following notice to the press: 
The Department of State has sent today the following 
statement to all foreign missions in Washington for their 
information: 
In view of the announcement of the Imperial Government 
on January 31, 1917, that all ships, those of neutrals included, 
met within certain zones of the high seas, would be sunk 
without any precautions being taken for the safety of the 
persons on board, and without the exercise of visit and 
search, the Government of the United States has determined 
to place upon all American merchant vessels sailing 
through the barred areas, an armed guard for the protection 
of the vessels and the lives of the persons on board.3 
The President's action was well received in the United States. 'l'he 
people were excited and inflamed over the conduct of Germany and welcomed 
lNew Republic, March 3, 1917, p. 149. 
2The Independent, u~rch 19, 1917, p. h82. 
3International Law Documents, Breaking of Diplomatic Relations, p. 16. 
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the attempt at armed neutrality. The press of the country was almost 
unanimous in its support of the measure and said so in emblazoned headlines.l 
Congressmen supported the action and even those who claimed the President 
did not have the right to arm the ships without Congressional authority 
were silent. 'I'he few pacifists who claimed the matter would involve us 
in war were drowned out in the general clamor and acclaim for the action. 
THE ATTEMPT AT ARMED NEUTRALITY 
At the start of World War I, the British had armed some of their 
merchant ships as a protection against armed German surface raiders and 
German cruisers. As these arms were for defensive purposes and the 
American Government so notified, the American Secretary of State at this 
time (1914) decided that such ships were to be treated as regular merchant-
men.2 The position of armed merchantmen as far as the United States was 
concerned remained essentially the same during the entire war. Thus when 
President Wilson led the United States in its attempt at 11 armed neutrality, 11 
the general ruling was that these ships should be treated as regular 
merchantmen in the accepted sense of the word. 
There were some precidents on armed neutrality for the guidance 
of the United States on this venture. In 1780, the Russians advanced 
the idea as a method of protecting commerce during the American War for 
Independence. 'I'he idea was supported by Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, Austria, 
and Portugal. In 1882, France and Spain recognized the principle and 
Holland tried but was prevented by an English declaration of war. The 
lR. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 499. 
2T. G. Frothingham, Armed Merchantmen, Current History Magazine, 
New York Times, p. 470. 
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demands of the League of Armed Neutrality were: 
1. Free passage of neutral ships from port to port and 
along coasts to combatants. 
2. Freedom of enemy goods in neutral ships except for 
contraband. 
3. A blockade to be lega~ must be effective.l 
In 1800, Russia again tried to form a lea~ue of armed neutrals to prevent 
British interference with shipping. Both these attempts had limited 
success. 'l'he history of the United States also shows an attempt to 
enforce international law by arming ships in 1798. At that time, mer-
chant ships were armed to prevent interference with ilJ!lerican shipping 
by Great Britain and France who were then at war. At the time of the 
United States attempt, Holland and Switzerland were practicing a form of 
armed neutrality. This was particularly effective in the case of 
Switzerland which was admirably located for this situation. 
It is problematical as to just what was President iiilson1 s hope 
when he armed the merchant ships. It was an answer to Germany's unre-
stricted warfare and possibly the hope was that the Kaiser would modify 
his policies. 11he honor of the United States was also at stake and this 
was an important factor to a great many Arooricans including the President. 
The protection of American rights, commerce, and shipping were other 
important elements which armed neutrality might be expected to accomplish. 
The President also hoped that he might keep the United States from involve-
ment in the European War and possibly force a peace upon the belligerents. 
There was little doubt that the policy would aid the Allies and work to 
the detriment of Germany. Had the merchant ships remained in American 
lw. L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 487. 
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harbors and refused to sail, the war effort of the Allies might have been 
seriously jeopardized. The President, it might be said, hoped for the 
best while fearing for the worst. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION 
The action of President Wilson in arming the American merchant ships 
without Congressional approval and authority has been discussed quite 
verbosely since Vvorld War I. He had asked for tne authority from Congress 
and had been prevented from receiving formal approval by the filibuster 
by eleven intransigent members of the Senate. For all practical purposes 
it might be said that he had the approval after the House action and the 
presentation of the manifesto of the 75. In analyzing the President's 
action it might be interesting to review briefly tne record a.."1d discuss 
some other possible courses of action. 
The President at the opening of the great war had asked the American 
people to be neutral in thought as well as action. In May 10, 1914, he 
had exasperated many Americans by his mild remonstrances and his "too 
proud to fight speech," after the Lusitania was sunk. Colonel House had 
been sent to l:!:urope on a peace mission in 1915 and haci. remained there 
almost a year attempting to halt the v;ar madness. tne oeace without vic-
tory campaign of late 1916 and early 1917 vrere manifestations of desire 
for peace and the hope to keep the United States out of the holocaust. 
In a speech at Pittsburgh on January 29, 1916, he said: 
There are two things which practically everybody who 
comes to the Executive Office in vvashington tells me. They 
tell me, 11 'fhe people are counting upon you to keep us out 
of war." And in the next breath what cio they tell, 11 'l'he 
people are equally count:mg upon you to maintain the honor 
of the united States. 11 Have you reflected tnat tne time 
may come when I could not do both?l 
lR.. J. Bartlett, The itecord of American Diolomacy, p. 1Jr9. 
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When the President armed the merchantships for the futile try at armed 
neutrality, he was doing so with the overv•helming support and desires 
of the nation. The Literary Digest expressed it by saying that the 
President had nation-wide approval and acclaim for the act.l 
There was no other course of action for IVJ.r. Nilson to take at the 
time. A possible early embargo of trade in arms and munitions such as 
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, .Sweden, and Switzerland had 
imposed might have changed the situation. However, the commercial in-
terests and the rising prosperity of the United States after a depres-
sion had eliminated any chance .. of this early in the War for reasons 
already discussed. Strict neutrality or cash and carry procedures might 
have prevented the action for armed neutrality, but it is quite doubtful. 
The lack of Allied shipping and the boomins AJaerican prosperity together 
prevented any chance of this action. After the German unrestricted war-
fare announcement, which was practically an ultimatum to the United 
States, there was nothing else for the President to attempt but armed 
neutrality. 
Many revisionist writers, after the end of vvorld War I, such as 
C. C. Tansill and H. E. Barnes have come up with many reasons for the 
involvement of the United States. The reasons offered are many and 
varied such as the munition makers, British propaganda, Wall Street, 
and the ar;ning of the merchant ships. In regard to the last it can be 
said with more justification that it was the last attempt of the United 
States to escape involvement. For in the final analysis the decision 
that the United States should go to war was made in Germany, not in the 
United States. 
lLiterary Digest, March 24, 1917, p. 801. 
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